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LANDON JENNINGS 
SOC 228 – SOCIOLOGY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
 
Violence against women is an endemic in North America (Drumbl, 1995). Specifically, 
“about one in ten married women experience battering each year, in Canada” (Macleod, 1980, p. 
67). In 1986, in an attempt to address this issue, the criminal justice system implemented a zero 
tolerance approach (also known as mandatory charging) to cases of domestic violence (Drumbl, 
1995). Advocates believe this approach is needed, whereas others believe that mandatory charging 
is too harsh.  
Regardless, abuse of female partners is still prevalent in our society, as the one in ten 
statistic still stands (Department of Justice, 2005). Women are abused every day, and many silently 
sit back until it is too late (Drumbl, 1995).  For example, in Singh (2010), the author discusses her 
encounter with victim of domestic violence named Cynthia. The author came across her working 
at the Victim Witness Assistant Program in an Ontario courthouse, where she followed her case 
closely (Singh, 2010).  Though the coordinators in this program did their best for Cynthia, she 
became part of the ongoing statistic of a woman, whose voice was silent as her husband battered 
and later murdered her.  As Singh (2010) explains, Cynthia’s death perfectly embodies the array 
of complexities that domestic violence incidents pose for the criminal justice system. Seeing the 
reality, the attempt to prevent harm through mandatory charging is important to understand. 
However, to do so, it is an imperative to ensure that people are educated on the Laws’ purpose. 
THE ZERO TOLERANCE APPROACH TO VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 
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This will not only ensure people understand the function, but will also allow for informed 
discussion about reforms to possibly better mitigate abuse.  
 The zero tolerance approach emerged in an attempt by advocates to take violence against 
woman more seriously (Martin & Mosher, 1995, p. 18). Supporters believed that “if charges were 
laid, when an assault occurred, offenders would be punished, and individual victims of violence 
would be protected and woman would benefit” (Martin & Mosher, 1995, p. 18). The belief was 
that the law was needed to ensure equality of women by treating abuse just like any other crime 
(Singh, 2010, p. 340). Also, being more punitive would send the message that domestic violence 
was not tolerated (Martin et al., 1995).  
Prior to the adoption of this approach, officers were able to decide how to deal with 
instances of abuse (Singh, 2010). However, when mandatory charging came into effect, police 
officers were “directed to lay charges in all instances of domestic violence where there is evidence 
of assault, regardless if the victim wants to press a charge or not” (Singh, 2010, p. 341). This was 
to prevent officers from making inappropriate decisions, and further reiterates the goal of the 
approach, which was to treat abuse as a criminal matter.  
 Another impetus for implementing this tough on crime approach to dealing with abuse 
stemmed from a history of systemic neglect (Singh, 2012).  Though laws prohibiting violence 
against woman existed since the early 1900’s, they were rarely utilized. As explained by Hilton 
(1988), “part of the difficulty (with evoking these laws) lies within the traditional definitions of 
abuse, as it has been characterized as a private matter, better dealt with in the home” (p. 314). 
Seeing this, many were reluctant to use existing laws and respond to abuse as a social problem.  
 The momentum to bring to light the prevalence of woman beating, and attempt to make 
abuse a social matter, occurred in the 1980’s (Drumbl, 1995). The critical factor in change was the 
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effort of feminist activists, such as Linda Macleod (Hilton, 1988). In her study, Wife Battering in 
Canada: The Vicious Circle (1980), she illustrated the frequency of female partner abuse in 
Canada and showed the inadequacy of current policies in preventing harm to victims (Macleod, 
1980). Specifically, she illustrated that 500,000 females were battered each year, yet studies 
indicated, “in 45% of cases where police presence was requested, advice was the response given” 
(Macleod, 1980, p.108). She concluded that by not being punitive, the legal system was supporting 
the “powerlessness of woman and accepting battering” (Macleod, 1980, p. 42). This led to the 
formation of a parliamentary committee, which eventually led to the suggestion of a zero tolerance 
approach (Singh, 2010).  
 Another Influential figure to this movement was the London Coordinating Committee on 
Family Violence, formed after Macleod’s study in 1981(Drumbl, 1995). This committee 
recommended that police discretion be removed in abuse cases, as they were placing charges in 
less than 5% of cases (Singh, 2012). London, Ontario thus became the first city to implement the 
zero tolerance policy, and from its implementation saw a significant increase in domestic violence 
calls (Drumbl, 1995). Specifically, research shows that “several years after implementing this 
policy, the number of domestic violence calls rose by 2500%” (Drumbl, 1995, p. 227). By 1986 
this approach was implemented to other Canadian jurisdictions (Singh, 2012). Currently, all 
Canadian jurisdictions follow the zero tolerance policy (Singh, 2010).  
 The implementation of zero tolerance has affected victims of abuse, perpetrators, and the 
response of law enforcement. Generally, this approach improves victim rights and successfully 
conveys the message that violence is unacceptable (Martin et al., 1995). Despite this, there are 
shortcomings (Drumbl, 1995). Specifically, “more than 75% of abuse incidents involve woman of 
colour,” yet they are the most reluctant to call for help since they tend to experience negative 
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consequences of the approach (Drumbl, 1995, p. 335). For instance, some minority woman may 
experience difficulty with language barriers when seeking aid from the police, along with the 
detrimental impact on family income that these woman experience upon their husband's’ 
incarceration.  
 For example, African-American woman are more prone to excuse their husband’s 
behaviour due to the negative consequences they have experienced (Drumbl, 1995). As illustrated 
by in Drumbl (1995):  
“all battered woman have the tendency to blame themselves and excuse their husband’s 
behaviour…but this tendency is more marked in African-American woman, who know 
only too well that that in this society, life is harder for black men than for white men” (p. 
235). 
Additionally, the loss of financial support is another major consequence of zero tolerance (Singh, 
2012). As studied by Martin and Mosher (1995), Unkept Promises: Experiences of Immigrant 
Women With the Neo-Criminalization of Wife Abuse, this criminal justice intervention causes more 
harm than good. Many Canadian women are dependent on their husbands, particularly financially 
(Singh, 2010). Thus, incarceration causes them more harm since women are left to figure out how 
to cover daily expenses for their families.  
This hardship (dependency) causes more problems for immigrant woman. Since husbands 
usually sponsor their immigrant wives to be in the country, the immigrant woman often faces the 
risk of deportation in the event of their husband's arrest (Martin et al., 1995). This threat leaves 
victims of abuse less likely to call the police. For instance, Martin and Mosher (1995) found that 
“husbands were able to terrorize immigrant wives with the fear of deportation, so many ignored 
abuse” (p. 26). Thus, zero tolerance sometimes causes more harm than good.  
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Despite the hardship some face in regards to the zero tolerance approach, advocates still 
believe this is the best method to prevent harm. For instance, Liberal feminists argue that despite 
the shortcomings, this policy is essential to send the message the abuse is unacceptable (Singh, 
2012). As argued by activist Linda Macleod, putting a law in place that is punitive sends a clear 
message and “shapes the values of society” which benefits woman as a whole (Singh, 2010 p. 43).  
On the contrary, some disagree that zero tolerance helps all woman, such as immigrants, 
and believe that this criminal justice response goes against empowerment model (Singh, 2010). 
Though the intent of this law is good, sometimes removing the discretion of victims causes more 
harm to victims. This was illustrated in Martin and Mosher (1995), as many immigrant women 
experienced difficulty once their husbands’ were charged with domestic abuse. With any domestic 
violence call for immigrant women, there is a possibility that her citizenship may be taken from 
her, and with this, her children, family, and dignity. Additionally, removing discretion aids in 
oppression of woman (Singh, 2012). By not having a say in the outcome of her abuse, opponents 
argue woman lose their voice. As illustrated in studying cases in Landau (2000), a victim stated: 
“they did not listen to me…show a little respect. They never asked me what I wanted, they just 
proceeded anyways” (Singh, 2010, p. 347). Thus, critics argue that zero tolerance approach is 
harmful.  
All in all, female partner abuse is a serious and complex issue. With the success of Liberal 
feminists advocating to be tough on spousal abuse, the reality of abuse is no longer hidden behind 
closed doors (Drumbl, 1995). Despite this success, it is an on ongoing debate as to whether this 
policy is the best to prevent harm and support victim rights. Currently, other avenues are being 
explored to determine the future direction of this criminal justice response. For example, treatment 
of abusers outside the justice system is being considered. Advocates argue this will reduce harm 
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since the abuser will receive treatment and the victim will not face the challenges (i.e. economic) 
that may come with incarceration (Drumbl, 1995). Despite this, the fear is that not being punitive 
will send the wrong message and result in an increase in abuse incidents. Thus, though zero 
tolerance may not be the best measure, female partner abuse is an important issue to understand 
since it is an ongoing issue, experienced by many women in society. 
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 AMANDA SPITZIG 
LS 401 – LAW, CULTURE AND RIGHTS 
 
The events of September 11, 2001 drastically altered the way North Americans view the 
concepts of safety, security, and terrorism. The unprecedented events of this date left the citizens 
of the United States in shambles, as the mass media saturated the world with images of 
hopelessness and despair (Schuster, 2011). Over 3,000 individuals lost their lives when an Al-
Qaeda terrorist group struck down the World Trade Centre buildings in New York City (O’Malley, 
2003). The political agenda of the White House was rapidly amended, as politicians focused on 
increasing national security measures in order to put the minds of the American citizens at ease. 
Canadians were not left unaffected by these events, and rapid policy changes also occurred north 
of the border (Whitaker, 2003). These controversial policy changes sparked a debate among 
politicians, academics, and the Canadian citizens about whether these new pieces of legislation 
represented an appropriate response to the perceived threat of terrorism. Twelve years later this 
debate still holds strong, and Bill C-36, The Anti-terrorism Act (2001), and Bill S-7, the Combating 
Terrorism Act (2013), both of which address crimes associated with terrorist activity, are still under 
constitutional scrutiny.   
This critical analysis paper will seek to explore both sides of this political and legal debate by 
tackling some of the major issues of concern in regards to anti-terrorism legislation. The 
TERRORISM AND ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION IN CANADA 
EXAMINING THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE 
MEDIA, AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENON OF 
TERROR ON CANADA’S DEMOCRATIC STATE 
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hegemonic influence of the United States over Canada after the events of 9/11 will be examined 
alongside the pieces of legislation that came into effect as a result. The definition of terrorism itself 
will be dissected, with special focus on comparing the media portrayal of terrorism with the actual 
motives and objectives of modern terrorist acts. The psychological phenomenon of terror will be 
examined in order to determine whether terrorism is a real or perceived threat to society. Finally, 
we will return to Canada’s anti-terrorism legislation in order to determine whether the legislation 
provides a real or perceived increase in security for Canadians, and how this legislation stands up 
to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
U.S. Hegemonic Influence on Canada’s Sovereign Domestic Policy-Making 
The asymmetrical power relationship between Canada and the United States played a major 
role in Canada’s policy-making decisions in the aftermath of 9/11. As North America was stricken 
with terror, governments capitalized on the heightened fear of the nation in order to rapidly 
advance controversial political agendas (Kellner, 2004). Sharing the longest undefended border 
with the United States, Canada was in a particularly unique situation in regards to anti-terrorism 
legislation. Although Canada was not directly in a state of emergency following 9/11, the United 
States chose to exercise their political influence over Canadian governments in order to ensure the 
safety and security of Americans (Biswas, 2009).   
A key concern for the American government was border control. In order to protect 
American national security, the government wanted to change how easily accessible the flow of 
goods and people into the country was (Biswas, 2009). State borders play an important role in both 
the political functioning of a state and its economic standing with bordering countries. Borders 
mark out a state’s territory, declare and exert national sovereignty, and “their selective 
permeability operates as a measure of the nation-state’s security against external threat” (Macklin, 
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2001). A country’s sovereignty over its state borders means that the country has the sole ability to 
control behaviour within the state borders, and the power to control movement across them. State 
governments must also have the capacity to make uninfluenced policy decisions within these 
borders (Biswas, 2009).  
Canada’s asymmetrical interdependent relationship with the United States resulted in the 
United States exercising hegemonic power over Canada’s sovereign border policies, and limited 
Canada’s ability to control their own border policies (Biswas, 2009). In particular, the American 
government scrutinized Canada’s immigration and refugee policies, noticing existing terrorist 
activity in Canada, and feared that these groups would be able to permeate American borders due 
to lax border security (Biswas, 2009). In response to 9/11, the United States government gave 
Canada two options: either modify existing domestic policies so that they fit in line with the 
American interests of heightened national security, or else Canada would face more restrictive 
border controls. This hegemonic exercise of political power outside of American borders sought 
to limit Canada’s autonomy over its domestic policy, thus infringing on Canada’s own sovereignty 
(Biswas, 2009).  
An American decision to tighten border security would have major economic implications 
for Canada, as the United States is Canada’s largest trading partner. In 2010, Canada exported $2.9 
billion of goods to the United States, accounting for 73.3% of the country’s total exports. In 
addition, Canada imported $2.6 billion of goods from the United States, accounting for 62.8% of 
Canada’s total imports (Statistics Canada, 2012). However, Canada’s economic relationship with 
the United States is very one-sided. In 2012, exports to Canada made up only 17.0% of total U.S. 
exports, and imports from Canada accounted for only 14.2% of total imports (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 2013). The diversified economy of the United States would not be as drastically 
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harmed by increased border control with Canada. The threat of economic sanctions forced 
Canadian politicians to react rapidly to the threat of terrorism, and pass legislation that conformed 
to American interests. 
 
Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Legislation 
The result of this hegemonic influence from the United States was Canada’s Anti-terrorism 
Act (Bill C-36). The bill was introduced into the House of Commons for its first reading on October 
15, 2001, and received royal assent on December 18, 2001, a mere 3 months after the events of 
9/11. The Anti-terrorism Act was a response to issues of national security and it altered many 
pieces of legislation. The full title of the Act is cited as: “An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the 
Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act 
and other Acts, and to enact measures respecting the registration of charities, in order to combat 
terrorism” (Anti-terrorism Act, 2001). Bill C-36: 
introduced new and potentially dangerous legal concepts such as 
investigative hearings, preventive arrests, broad motive-based crimes based 
on participation in or contribution to terrorist groups at home or abroad, as 
well as new powers to list terrorist groups, take their property, and deprive 
suspected terrorists of sensitive security information in their trials and 
appeals. (Roach, 2002)  
 
The bill also ratified two United Nations Conventions: the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorist Bombings (Lennox, 2007).  
The new provisions of the Anti-terrorism Act did not come without a price tag. Funding to 
support the implementation of the increased security measures amounted to $7.7 billion over five 
years, which was announced by then finance minister Paul Martin in the December 2001 federal 
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budget (Lennox, 2007). This sum of money was “proportionately larger than the US allocation to 
the same objectives” (Clarkson, 2003).  
The bill received very minimal public input before being passed as law in Canada despite 
the fact that it drastically increased the investigative and surveillance capabilities of the 
government (Lennox, 2007). The Liberal government presented a time allocation motion on Bill 
C-36 after only four-and-a-half hours of debate in order to limit the amount of discussion on the 
bill. They also used a process called pre-consultation, used in the Senate, in order to push the bill 
through Parliament as quickly as possible (Lennox, 2007). Although Canada had not declared a 
state of emergency as the United States did following 9/11, it is evident that this legislation was 
introduced in a “climate of emergency” (Diab, 2008). It was necessary for legislation to be passed 
very rapidly through Parliament in order to capitalize on the spirit of urgency, as the United States 
viewed terrorism as a very imminent threat to the country. 
 
What is Terrorism? The Psychological Phenomenon of Terror and the Influence of Media 
 
Although Canada has taken drastic measures to increase national security, the question 
remains as to whether terrorism poses a real threat to society. In order to understand this issue, we 
must examine the definition of terrorism, and examine the motivations behind modern terrorist 
organizations. There is an interesting discrepancy between the mass media portrayal of terrorism 
and the political understanding of the term. The terms “terrorist” and “terrorism” have saturated 
mass media news outlets since 9/11 (Kellner, 2004). These words are used repeatedly to label 
certain groups in society, although no proper definition of the terms is ever explained. The word 
“terrorism” is very highly stigmatized, and it is often used indiscriminately (O’Neil, 2010). Before 
examining the mass media portrayal, it is important to dissect the true meaning of the term 
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terrorism in order to understand the objectives of modern terrorist groups, and make an objective 
comparison to the media portrayal of the topic.  
To begin to understand the true definition of terrorism, it is important to analyse the 
meaning of the root word, of these two words, terror. The Oxford English dictionary defines terror 
as “extreme fear”. The instillation of extreme fear into the mass population is what legitimizes acts 
of terror (Biernatzki, 2002). Terrorism, on the other hand, proves to be a much more difficult term 
to define. The United Nations has not been able to decide on a definition of the term, mainly 
because the term is used very differently by various state leaders. State leaders use the word 
terrorism whenever they find their state interests to be under threat; whether this is from liberation 
struggles, guerrilla war, or any other attempt to overthrow the political elite (Melnyk, 2010). Still, 
fear is the underlying concept that is consistent throughout all ideas of terrorism. State leaders fear 
that their state interests are at risk. Regardless of whether an objective definition of the word 
terrorism is reached, it is clear that this emotion of fear and terror is the fundamental theme in all 
situations where the word terrorism is used.  “Terrorism is the intentional generation of massive 
fear by human beings for the purpose of securing or maintaining control over other human beings” 
(Cooper, 2001). Fear is the primary mechanism by which terrorist organizations seek to gain 
control over populations and further their own political agendas. Whether this is achieved through 
actual violence, or merely the threat of violence, implanting fear into the minds of the target group 
is what makes an act of terrorism successful. Terror is largely a psychological phenomenon; it has 
the power to immobilize people, and coerce them into action. 
The mass media has done a successful job at legitimizing the threat of terror in the minds 
of North Americans, and perpetuating the “Us vs. Them” ideology that terrorism is an inherent 
component of Islamic cultures. North Americans have come to understand the word “terrorism” 
  VOLUME 1 | 2016   P a g e  | 19 
 
  
as “a violent act against an innocent population perpetrated by heartless, fanatical enemies of that 
population or its government, whose only goal is death and destruction” (Melnyk, 2010). The mass 
media, as well as politicians promoting this anti-terrorism legislation, have stripped the political 
and moral justifications from acts of terrorism, and replaced these with ideas of fear and loathing 
towards particularly Middle-Eastern nations (Melnyk, 2010). North Americans are fed images of 
Islamic groups on nightly news segments, as racialized headlines flash across the television screen. 
The idea that terrorism is an inherent part of the Muslim and Islamic culture instils additional fear 
in the minds of North Americans. Members of these minority groups are racially profiled and 
further victimized in society because they have been labelled as “Them”, a distinct group in society 
whose cultural values are viewed as different and inferior from the Westernized norms.   
In reality, terrorist groups have similar goals as politicians or journalists, and mass media 
ironically works to further these goals. These overlapping objectives include: 
1. Access – getting prominent headlines and airtime. 
2. Name recognition – getting one’s name or organizational “brand” readily 
known. 
3. Setting the agenda – gaining power to frame issues and set the terms of 
debate. (Widlanski, 2012) 
 
When news headlines constantly feature stories about terrorist groups, emotions of fear and terror 
are instilled in media consumers, which is precisely the primary objective of an act of terror. 
Giving terrorist groups access to airtime maintains the emotion of terror in the public. Foremost, 
terror is a psychological phenomenon, and media access legitimizes this emotion, adding fuel to 
the fire of terrorism. In George Melnyk’s essay titled “The Word ‘Terrorism’ and its Impact on 
Public Consciousness”, Melnyk effectively explains this vicious circle that happens between the 
media and terrorism, and how this works to support government objectives: 
When terrorism is put at the forefront of public concern, forces are unleashed 
that are profoundly anti-democratic. The word creates a demagogic atmosphere 
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in which fear reigns supreme and that fear much be refreshed from time to time 
with real actions in the real world. When events labelled “terrorism” recede 
into memory and are not refreshed with fresh events so labelled, the term loses 
its potency as political explanation and mobilization. (Melnyk, 2010)   
 
The major issue with the media portrayal of terrorism is that media outlets fail to present an 
objective view of the issue. A notable news network that is notorious for this is CNN, who because 
had become one of the most prominent media outlets following before the events of 9/11 (Saighal, 
2004). CNN features news broadcasts that reflect the desires of the American government and is 
filled with misinformation and disinformation on the topic of terrorism (Saighal, 2004). 
Unfortunately, this results in only one side of the story being shared, which is advantageous for 
governments in their policy objectives (Melnyk, 2010). If mass media can maintain the emotion 
of fear in the minds of a country’s citizens, it is more likely that the citizen’s will support 
controversial policy objectives from the government that undermine the principles of democracy 
(Melnyk, 2010). Analysed through the structural functionalist perspective of society, legislation 
works to set a country’s mind at ease. Confidence is the opposite emotion of terror, and the 
population is more likely to agree with the objectives of the government if they appear to be 
confident in their methods of eliminating terrorism (Melnyk, 2010). However, the function of 
media is to remind citizens of the potential for terror, forming a basis for the creation of these 
government policies. Thus, a full-circle effect occurs. If policy has done a successful job at creating 
a false sense of security in the minds of Canadians, the mass media has done an equally successful 
job at dismantling this security (Melnyk, 2010).  
Politicians and academics are also largely concerned with the intentions of terrorists. Why 
do certain groups choose suicide bombings over car bombs? What motivated the al-Qaeda group 
to hijack two airplanes and fly them into the World Trade Centre buildings in New York? 
Understanding these intentions allows policy makers to understand why these acts occur, and to 
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target certain acts with a through policy and to better understand why these acts occur. Aside from 
the primary goal of instilling fear, terrorist organizations are motivated by political, ideological, 
and religious reasons. Political terrorists are motivated by the desire to eliminate colonial rule and 
institute a change in political power. Religious terrorists work to assert their cultural beliefs, which 
they believe are superior to all other groups. Ideological terrorist groups are motivated by the desire 
to end economic oppression (Lauderdale & Oliverio, 2005). The end objective is carefully 
outlined, and then a plan is developed with the intent of achieving this objective while 
simultaneously intimidating the authorities (Whittaker, 2002).  Modern terrorist group activity 
must be considered in both the context of both historical and political contexts of the nation in 
order to understand the motivations behind the acts and predict future threats to society.   
Modern Terrorist Groups and their Motivations 
 
 The Canadian government has faced challenges to terrorism on both a domestic as well as 
international front. In June of 2006, 18 individuals were arrested for plotting a series of attacks 
throughout southern Ontario. This terrorist plot became known as Toronto 18. One of the plans 
was to bomb the Toronto Stock Exchange as well as other prominent buildings throughout 
southern Ontario (CBC News, 2008). The group was attempting to create a large terrorist unit in 
Toronto, similar to that of al-Qaeda. The group wanted to arm themselves with weapons and wreak 
havoc in order to scare the Canadian public, and influence Canada to withdraw troops from 
Afghanistan, which was the primary political objective of their terrorist plot (CBC News, 2008).  
There was a great amount of discrepancy between the actual facts in the Toronto 18 case, 
versus the media portrayal of the case. Prime Minister Stephen Harper publicly announced that the 
group of radicalized youths was motivated by a hatred of democracy, and were targeting Canadian 
values such as freedom and the rule of law (Miller & Sack, 2008). Media outlets worked very 
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closely with the Prime Minister’s Office, and top bureaucrats provided instruction to politicians 
and security officials regarding what information to reveal in any interviews. The office also 
carefully monitored what was released to the public in order to ensure that all media coverage 
portrayed the idea that this domestic terrorist plot was inspired by Al-Qaeda, and would have had 
a magnitude similar to that of the Oklahoma City bombings if law enforcement hadn’t apprehended 
the group (Miller & Sack, 2008). A high level of fear was injected into the minds of Canadians by 
this media coverage. However, 15 months after the initial arrests, charges had been dropped against 
seven of the eighteen suspects. No evidence of radicalization, hatred of democracy, or any ties to 
Al-Qaeda terrorist groups were proven (Miller & Sack, 2008). 1,700 pages of government 
correspondence obtained by the Globe and Mail proved that the Conservative government had 
monitored all media outlets, ensuring that the public had confidence that the government was 
fighting terror (Miller & Sack, 2008). False motivations were portrayed to the public through the 
media, and the accused individuals were represented in a way such that the public saw their 
motivations that were radical and violent in nature, as compared to shadowing the actual legitimate 
political objectives of the group. The government had worked closely with the media in order to 
create a climate of fear and emergency, creating a perceived threat that was drastically larger than 
the real threat that the terrorist group posed.  
 In contrast to these this example of domestic terrorism, international terrorist organizations 
also plague North Americans with fear. The unprecedented events of 9/11 formed the basis for all 
modern anti-terrorism legislation in North America, and reinforced the constant racialization of 
terrorists by the mass media. Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda terrorist organization were 
motivated by both religious and political reasons. In bin Laden’s “Letter to America” he begins by 
addressing Allah, explaining how believers are given permission to fight by Allah because they 
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have been wronged (Bin Laden, 2002). Bin Laden also lists many political reasons for waging an 
attack against the United States. These include previous American attacks in Palestine and 
Somalia, America’s dominance in the global oil market, America’s control of Iraq, and various 
reasons involving America’s wealth as well as support of the Jewish population (Bin Laden, 2002). 
 What is unknown by many people is that although the attack on the World Trade Centres 
caused an unparalleled number of civilian casualties for a single act of terrorism, this high death 
toll was unintended. Osama bin Laden recorded a video from the depths of a cave, in which he 
outlined his Vision for the World. In this video, bin Laden outlined his preparations for the attack 
on New York City. When speaking about the planned magnitude of the attack, he said: 
[W]e calculated in advance the number of casualties from the enemy, who 
would be killed based on the position of the tower. We calculated that the floors 
that would be hit would be three or four floors […] I was thinking that the fire 
from the gas in the plane would melt the iron structure of the building and 
collapse the area where the plane hit and all the floors above it only. This is all 
that we had hoped for. (Whittaker, 2002) 
   
Although citizen casualties were still planned into the attack, it is interesting to note that the 
original plan for the attack was not motivated by a mass killing of American civilians. The attack’s 
primary objective was political, and it was justified through religious means (Bin Laden, 2002). 
Again, it is evident that the use of mass media has affected perceptions of terrorist motivations. 
Media outlets label Islamic terrorist groups as a distinct culture in which violence is an inherent 
element (Smith, 2013). However, it is clear that there are political, religious, and ideological 
justifications behind the actions. 
 
Terrorism: A Real or Perceived Threat to Society? 
 
 After carefully considering the concept of terrorism, the influence of the media, and the 
actual objectives of modern terrorist plots, the question arises as to whether terrorism is a real 
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threat to society, or whether this fear is merely a psychological phenomenon, legitimized by 
governments to further their political objectives and undermine democracy. Terrorist groups do 
post a legitimate threat to society. Terrorist groups target public locations, and put the lives of 
civilians at risk in order to further their objectives. Whether or not the terrorist group has the intent 
to harm civilians, the risk is still present due to the nature of their activities. For example, Osama 
bin Laden claimed that his terrorist organisation did not intent to collapse both of the World Trade 
Centres, killing 3,000 American citizens (Bin Laden, 2002). However, they still had the intent to 
fly the two airplanes into the towers and kill a number of civilians. Evidently plans do not always 
proceed as expected, but the magnitude of harm was certainly reasonably foreseeable. 
 Terrorism also poses real threats to both the economic and political stability of a nation. 
Highly publicised and effective terrorist attacks are successful in depressing tourism, reducing 
foreign investment into a country, and harming the stock markets (O’Neil, 2010). Politically, 
terrorist groups pose a threat to the governing regime of the country, and the democratic function 
of the state in North America. As citizens constantly see images of terrorist activity on news 
programs, the people may begin to lose faith in the government if it does not allocate a significant 
amount of resources towards combating terrorism. In achieving this goal of greater national 
security, a trade-off occurs between civil liberties and state authority, leading to a breakdown of 
democratic institutions (O’Neil, 2010). Canada’s Anti-terrorism Act was passed through 
parliament during a time of heightened national fear. This government response was intended to 
reassure Canadians that their safety and security was of primary importance, generating national 
support for the legislation. However, the demagogic method that the government used in order to 
create this support suggests that perhaps terrorism doesn’t pose as imminent of a threat to society 
as the media portrays. If governments are relying on emotionally based arguments to support the 
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threat of terrorism rather than concrete evidence, concerns are raised as to what the real objectives 
of government actions are, and whether this psychological phenomenon of terror is being 
strategically used to gain support for controversial legislation.  
 
Implications of Anti-terrorism Legislation on Canadian Charter Rights 
 
 Several aspects of Canada’s Anti-terrorism Act have come under scrutiny for their 
adherence to democratic principles, and the constitutionality of the Act. As previously mentioned, 
Canada did not declare a state of national emergency following the events of 9/11. However, the 
Anti-terrorism Act was still rapidly passed through Parliament with a spirit of urgency, despite the 
insistence from the Canadian government that it was not a piece of emergency legislation (Weinrib, 
2001). During debate over the bill, reference was made to the War Measures Act of 1914, and 
politicians argued that the Anti-terrorism Act was constitutionally sound because the War 
Measures Act justified the authorization for emergency executive state power in times of crisis. 
Interestingly, the War Measures Act was repealed and replaced with the Emergencies Act in 1988, 
but no reference to the later Act was mentioned in debate (Weinrib, 2001). Considering that the 
Anti-terrorism Act was not considered emergency legislation, and the basis for its justification was 
a repealed act whose purpose was to justify state power in emergency situations, the 
constitutionality of the Anti-terrorism Act remains a major political issue. It is also interesting to 
note that a sunset clause was not included in the legislation. A sunset clause would require that the 
legislation be reviewed for constitutionality after a certain time period has passed. The lack of this 
sunset clause made many of these controversial new executive powers permanent (Diab, 2008).  
 Emphasis on government power is also evident in the change of rhetoric used in 
Parliamentary debate between the first and third readings of Bill C-36. When the bill was proposed 
in the first reading on October 15, 2001, then Minister of Justice Anne McLellan assured 
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Canadians that “Charter rights [had] been considered and preserved against the objectives of 
fighting terrorism and protecting national security” (Diab, 2008). During the third reading of the 
bill, emphasis for the bill’s justification transitioned to primarily security-centred concerns. 
McLellan stated that:  
Now is the time to move forward. Canadians expect their government to act to 
ensure their security and safety. […] What we are doing in Bill C-36 […] is 
putting in place the legal and operational infrastructure necessary to provide 
Canadians with that degree of safety and security that permits them to get on 
with their lives. (Diab, 2008) 
 
What can be taken from this argument is that the Anti-terrorism Act was a response to this 
psychological phenomenon of terror. McLellan states that the purpose of Bill C-36 is to allow 
Canadians to “get on with their lives” and move beyond the state of fear caused by 9/11, into a 
state of security and confidence in the government. 
Specific provisions created by the Anti-terrorism Act also raised cause for alarm, as 
violations of Charter rights became an issue of concern. In particular, the offence of “facilitating” 
an act of terrorism and the vague mens rea elements of this offence has been challenged in 
Canadian Courts (Diab, 2008). The full provision, section 83.19 of the Criminal Code, can be 
found in Appendix A. This provision has been criticized as having eradicated the fault element in 
criminal law. A person could be charged under this offence without knowing they were in fact 
facilitating terrorism (Diab, 2008). It has been argued that “the only remaining fault element [in 
the offence] would be failing to take reasonable care to ensure that what was being facilitated was 
actually not a terrorist activity” (Diab, 2008).  
Momin Khawaja, the leader of the Toronto 18 terrorist plot, was the first person to be 
convicted under Canada’s Anti-terrorism Act in 2008. He was found guilty of five charges of 
financing and facilitating terrorism, and two Criminal Code offences related to building explosive 
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devices (MacCharles, 2008). He was originally sentenced to 10 ½ years in prison, but the sentence 
was increased to life in prison with no chance of parole for 10 years by Ontario’s Superior Court 
of Justice (MacCharles, 2008). Khawaja argued under section 52(1) of the Canadian Constitution 
that certain provisions of section 83 of the Criminal Code were inconsistent with the Constitution, 
therefore they should be of no force or effect. Khawaja claimed that “the provisions are vague 
and/or over-broad, they dilute the essential fault requirements of criminal law, and they infringe 
[the] rights of association, freedom of conscience and religion, and freedom of thought, belief, 
opinion, and expression pursuant to section 2 of the Charter” (Diab, 2008). The Court upheld the 
decision that the provision was not vague because they had “sufficiently clear meanings” (R v 
Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69, 3 SCR 555). Khawaja also challenged the inclusion of political, religious, 
and ideological objectives in the Court’s definition of a terrorism offence, arguing that the labelling 
of these motives cases a chilling effect over minority groups in Canada, violating section 2 
Charter. The Court agreed with Khawaja that this was a prima facie infringement of rights, but 
that it was justified under section 1 of the Charter because this violation represented a minimal 
infringement on the rights in order to protect Canadian interests (R. v. Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69, 3 
SCR 555). This case was the first major challenge for Canada’s new Anti-terrorism Act in the 
Canadian courts. 
 
Conclusions: The Justification of Charter Rights Violations in a Democratic Society    
 
 The justification of anti-terrorism legislation in Canada is evidently a process in which 
Canadians see limitations placed on their Charter rights. This challenge to the democratic 
functioning in Canada began following the events of 9/11, when the United States gave Canada 
two options in terms of domestic policy: to either implement policy in line with American interests, 
or face harsh border restrictions. American hegemonic influence also infiltrated the media, which 
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is the primary mechanism used to instil fear into the minds of citizens. As people are constantly 
presented with images and ideas of non-Westernized cultures as inherently violent, fear begins to 
creep into domestic life as well. Canadian governments capitalized on this fear by implementing 
the controversial Anti-terrorism Act in December of 2001, and put the minds of Canadian citizens 
at ease by sending the message that national security was a high priority. However, the media does 
an excellent job at camouflaging the true motives of terrorist organizations. In the Toronto 18 case, 
it was revealed that the Canadian government was working hand-in-hand with media outlets to 
amplify fear. This demagogic effect, where false reasons were portrayed based on emotion, 
connects the issue of anti-terrorism legislation full-circle: terrorist groups portray fear, the media 
amplifies the fear, and governments capitalize on these skewed media messages. Although 
politicians claim that anti-terrorism legislation is in the best interests of Canadians, and the 
violation of Charter rights is justified, these issues are still up for contest. With the recent Supreme 
Court review of the R. v. Khawaja in 2012 it is clear that the provisions of the Anti-terrorism Act 
still remain an area for debate 12 years after its implementation. Acts of terrorism, although few 
and far between in Canada, do pose a real threat to the safety of Canadians. However, the primary 
motivation of terrorist acts in instilling terror in the minds of civilians, not mass killing, as is 
depicted by the media. If the mass media presented an objective view of terrorist motivations rather 
than amplifying terror in the minds of North Americans, Canadians may have a significantly 
different view about the democratic function of the state and Canada’s Anti-terrorism Act.  
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Appendix A: Section 83.19 of the Criminal Code 
 
Facilitating terrorist activity 
   83.19 (1) Every one who knowingly facilitates a terrorist activity is guilty of an 
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years. 
  
 (2) For the purposes of this Part, a terrorist activity is facilitated whether or not 
   (a) the facilitator knows that a particular terrorist activity is facilitated; 
   (b) any particular terrorist activity was foreseen or planned at the time it 
was facilitated; or 
  (c) any terrorist activity was actually carried out. 
 
(Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s. 17; RSC 1985, c 27 [1st Supp]) 
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SUKHRAAJ SHERGILL 
LS 102 – INTRODUCTION OT CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Freedom and security are often seen as opposites in modern society. One must be 
relinquished in part to further a sense of the other. Religious rights under section 2a of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) are often contrasted with the legal right to life, 
liberty and security under section 7 and the concept of public safety as was the case with Multani 
v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys (Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-
Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6, [2006] 1 SCR 256). The Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-
Bourgeoys case centered around the sheathed Kirpan Mr. Multani, a twelve year-old baptized Sikh, 
carried; which fell from its strap, still sheathed on a playground. The case reached the Supreme 
Court of Canada as it concerned the religious article: the Kirpan. If the Supreme Court of Canada 
had ruled in favour of removing the Kirpan from Gurbaj Singh Multani, the Court would be 
impeding his beliefs and be damaging to his sense of identity, as it would also encroach on religious 
rights. Section 2a of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states, "[e]veryone has the 
following fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom of conscience and religion" (The Constitution Act, 
1982). This paper will synthesize the Multani argument under section 2a of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (1982) and explain the significance of the Kirpan before progressing to 
synthesize the Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys’ argument under section 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982). The paper will also lay out a preliminary 
THE KIRPAN: JUSTIFIED DOCTRINE OR JUST A DAGGER? – 
WHEN RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS CLASH WITH PUBLIC SAFETY 
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understanding of section 88(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada as it explains the definition of a 
weapon in relation to section 267 of the Criminal Code of Canada, the crime of assault as related 
to the Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys’ argument. The paper will then close by 
summarizing the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgement on the matter. 
Firstly, in support of the Multani argument utilizing section 2a of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (1982), the Kirpan is a religious requirement for all baptized Sikhs, formally 
known as Amritdhari Khalsa Sikhs (Jhutti-Johal, 2011, p. 96-97). It is essentially a dagger or 
ceremonial sword worn by baptized Sikhs that is a defensive article in the direst of circumstances. 
However, the Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys argued that the Kirpan is indeed a 
weapon that can be used to injure people. Therefore, the Commission asserted that the Kirpanis a 
dangerous article that has implications when regarding sections 7 and 1 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (1982) in conjunction with interpretations of sections 88(1) and 267 of the 
Criminal Code of Canada (1985). Finally, resolving these two standpoints, restrictions can be 
enforced to protect public safety in conjunction with accommodating the Kirpan and maintaining 
rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), as well as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966).  
Primarily, the Kirpan is an integral part of the Sikh religion, belief, and identity. It is one 
of the five articles that are compulsory for baptized Sikhs. These five articles are considered the 
uniform of a Sikh,   
…each beginning with the Gurmukhi letter k. These are kes (uncut hair), a kangha 
(comb), a kirpan (dagger or short sword), a kara (wrist-ring of either iron or steel) 
and kachh (shorts that must not reach below the knee). [Baptized] Sikhs…promise 
to wear the Five K’s. (McLeod, 2008, p.326-327). 
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These Sikhs swear to have the Five K’s with them at all times. The value of the Kirpan stretches 
beyond the guarantees of religious freedom in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(1982) and has historical significance to Sikhs.  
The Kirpan is entrenched in the history of the Sikhs. The Five K`s commemorate historical 
events for Sikhs such as when the ninth Guru, Guru Tegh Bahadur Sahib Ji, was executed for 
protecting the religious rights of the Hindus (Johar, 1975, p. 192-210). During this era, Sikhs were 
not distinguishable from the rest of the populace. The Five K`s gave a distinct appearance to Sikhs. 
The Kirpan furthered this distinct appearance as it aligned and solidified the intangible moral 
obligation of Sikhs with the tangible concept of the Kirpan, to become "an instrument of 
compassion to be used to protect and safe-guard [the] dignity or honour of others" (Bachu, 1996, 
p. 203). Sikhs view the Kirpan as a defensive tool that is used strictly to help others and not to be 
used in an offensive manner.   
Furthermore, the meaning and reasoning behind the Kirpan itself is "…derived from the  
Sanskrit words Kirpa and Aan meaning mercy or compassion and honour or dignity” (Singh, 2005, 
p. 287). It is perceived as a symbol that represents a "…duty to fight for good over evil, and to 
always support freedom above oppression" (Bagga, 2006, p. 7). The Kirpan has an inherently noble 
meaning rooted in the Sikh belief itself and is meant to be a positive symbol as the Multani 
argument represented it. The ties of the Kirpan to the Sikh religion connect the article of faith to 
the religion and subsequently, section 2a of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982). 
The Kirpan is not to be utilized in a violent manner; which stands in stark contrast to its attempted 
characterization by the Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys as an offensive weapon. 
Conversely, the Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys brought forth the point that 
the Kirpan, while being an article of faith with defensive and benevolent connotations, still carries 
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the potential to be a fatal weapon and thus could have detrimental effects on public safety. In 
essence, the Commission asserted that the Kirpan is a ceremonial dagger and that a dagger is, by 
definition a "…weapon designed to kill, intimidate or threaten others" (Schutter, 2010, p. 354). 
Religious affiliations aside, the Kirpan, without restrictions, does indeed carry with it the capacity 
to severely wound a person if used. Before the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys case, the Kirpan was allowed in schools 
subject to the condition that it be “…strapped…[and] riveted to [its sheath] or the blade was blunt 
with a rounded tip” (Hamilton, 2005, p. 115-116). This meant that prior to the Supreme Court 
decision; schools were required to restrict the Kirpan to only a cloth strap – both of which could 
be undone relatively easily – and a dull blade. These restrictions could, at the discretion of the 
individual school district be augmented by the option of riveting the blade to its sheath. However, 
leaving this choice to individual school boards and avoiding a standard leaves the option that the 
Kirpan could still be utilized if the school board did not employ the option of riveting. If the Kirpan 
were to ever be utilized, even a dull blade could pierce flesh in a fatal manner. As this is a 
recognized threat, the school district’s decision to make a safety measure such as riveting optional 
and not required, still provides the chance of use. It is clear that the Kirpan, with religious status 
removed, becomes a fatal weapon with unreasonable restrictions that has the potential to violate 
section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982).   
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) states that “[e]veryone 
has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except 
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice” (The Constitution Act, 1982). The Kirpan 
essentially becomes a weapon that has the capacity to deprive someone of their right to life and 
security of the person as it can be used in an offensive manner. It has the capability to be used to 
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injure another person and at this point becomes strictly a dagger with no religious significance; as 
well as an entirely real threat to the security of the person while restrictions on length serve to 
further counteract the effectiveness of the Kirpan as a weapon (Fox, 1985, p. 114-115). 
Furthermore, section 88(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada (1985) states that “[e]very 
person commits an offence who carries or possesses a weapon, an imitation of a weapon, a 
prohibited device or any ammunition or prohibited ammunition for a purpose dangerous to the 
public peace or for the purpose of committing an offence”. This section of the Criminal Code of 
Canada (1985) specifically states that anyone who “…carries or possesses a weapon…for a 
purpose dangerous to the public peace…” (Criminal Code, section 88(1)), is guilty of a criminal 
offence. However, one must be careful in interpreting section 88(1) or any law, down to the letter. 
As the option to interpret the law in question via a lens that focuses on the intention of the law in 
contrast to its literal meaning exists, the Kirpan is reasonable to possess and carry. The intention 
of the law is not to supress religious freedoms. However, applying a literal understanding of section 
88(1) creates a scenario where, a Kirpan, with its religious significance removed, essentially 
becomes just a dagger that has the sole purpose of being a danger to the public peace. This is not 
to mention that the mere act of being in possession and carrying the Kirpan would constitute an 
offence (Nkomo, 2011).  
The Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, applying a literal analysis of section 
88(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada (1985), raised the legal principle of inchoate offences and 
the concept of preventing a crime prior to its occurrence. Inchoate offences are “…a unique class 
of criminal offences in the sense that they criminalize acts that precede harmful conduct but do not 
necessarily inflict harmful consequences in and of themselves” (Chapman, 2014, p. 245). 
The crime of assault under section 267 of the Criminal Code of Canada (1985) is defined as 
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[e]very one who, in committing an assault, (a) carries, uses or threatens to use a 
weapon or an imitation thereof, or (b) causes bodily harm to the complainant, is 
guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
ten years or an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding eighteen months. (Criminal Code, section 
267). 
 
When the principle of inchoate offences is applied to the Criminal Code of Canada’s (1985) 
definition of committing an assault and further applied to the Kirpan, an assault with the Kirpan is 
a preventable offence. This is applicable by removing the religious significance of the Kirpan, in 
which case it becomes strictly a dagger with the purpose and ability of causing harm. The Multani 
v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys case brought forth the intriguing broad notion of 
whether religious rights and security rights – specifically the Kirpan and public safety rights – 
could coexist peacefully. Further, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld that the spirit of the law is 
greater than the letter of the law. The Court answered the notion by upholding restrictions on the 
length, casing and maintenance of the Kirpan while disregarding the literal application of section 
267a of the Criminal Code of Canada (1985) as simply carrying the Kirpan would once again 
constitute an offence.  
Ultimately, the responsibility to reconcile the “freedom of religion” (The Constitution Act, 
1982) under section 2a and the right to “…life, liberty and security…” (The Constitution Act,1982) 
under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) fell upon the Supreme 
Court of Canada. It had to decide if a total ban on the Kirpan was justified by applying the R. v. 
Oakes (R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103) test in relation to section 1 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (1982). Section 1states that “[t]he Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” (The Constitution Act, 
1982).  
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The well-established R. v. Oakes test lays out the process that the Court must use to 
determine if a violation of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms has occurred. The test begins once a violation of a protected right or freedom has 
occurred. The Court must then determine if the law in question provides a reasonable restriction 
that follows section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982). Finally, should the 
law fail to be a reasonable restriction; the Court can strike it down (Oakes, 2013). The Supreme 
Court of Canada in the Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys case was convinced 
that the not allowing Gurbaj Singh Multani to attend the school with his Kirpan was a violation of 
his section 2a right under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982). This violation 
invoked the procedure of the R. v. Oakes test and the Court decided that upholding the conditions 
placed upon the Kirpan by the Superior Court of Quebec constituted a reasonable step that 
protected both rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These conditions were 
that,   
the Kirpan was to be worn under the student’s clothes; the Kirpan was to be placed 
in a wooden sheath and wrapped and sewn securely in a sturdy cloth envelope, 
which was to be sewn to a shoulder strap (guthra); the student was required to keep 
the Kirpan in his possession at all times, and its disappearance was to be reported 
to school authorities immediately; school personnel were authorized to verify, in a 
reasonable fashion, that the conditions for wearing the Kirpan were being complied 
with; and if these conditions were not complied with, the student would definitively 
lose the right to wear a Kirpan. (Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-
Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6, [2006] 1 SCR 256, para. 88). 
 
These conditions made the Kirpan become almost impossible to use as an offensive or defensive 
weapon by being wrapped in repetitive sheets of cloth, further encased in a wooden sheath and, 
finally, being sewn into a shoulder strap. In this way, the restrictions satisfied the requirement of 
section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) by removing almost any chance 
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of using the Kirpan to harm the life, liberty or security of a person as the Kirpan could not be 
efficiently removed from its security measures to assault someone with.  
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada nullified any likelihood of the Kirpan being 
utilized as a weapon via the imposition of a set of security measures and conditions which served 
essentially as an ultimatum: either the conditions would be met or the Kirpan would be removed. 
This decision followed a similar vein as that of the Grant v. Canada case, which also centered on 
section 2a (Grant v. Canada (Attorney General), 1994 CanLII 3507 (FC), [1995] 1 CF 158) and 
the R. v. Badesha case, which centered on sections 2a and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (1982), (R. v. Badesha, 2010 ONCJ 10 (CanLII)). In both cases the section 2a rights of 
Sikhs in Canada were upheld. At issue in those cases were whether the Turban was against the 
uniform regulations of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Grant v. Canada (Attorney General), 
1994 CanLII 3507 (FC), [1995] 1 CF 158) and whether the Turban was against motorcycle 
regulations, (R. v. Badesha, 2010 ONCJ 10 (CanLII)) respectively. 
The restrictions imposed by the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Kirpan to remain in 
the possession of the Sikh who was to be carrying it without changing the Kirpan itself. In this 
way, the restrictions were a reasonable violation of section 2a of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (1982). The religious article was retained as the religion dictated while its actual 
use was limited in an effort to balance the rights of the public under section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982).  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision to uphold the Superior Court of 
Quebec’s conditions solidified the integral value of Canadian society that is multiculturalism 
(Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6, [2006] 1 SCR 256, para. 
71). The decision however, did not give an unlimited right to Sikhs in that the Kirpan was heavily 
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shielded and rendered useless in a confrontation. The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the 
Kirpan was not a weapon and was tied to a sincerely held religious belief, such that its restriction 
would violate section 2a of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982). However, the 
Supreme Court of Canada also recognized, under section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (1982), that the restrictions on the religious freedom to bear the Kirpan; imposed by the 
Superior Court of Quebec, were reasonable and justified limits. Limits that were employed to 
minimally impair the right to religious freedom and also to ensure public safety as the Kirpan had 
the potential to pose a risk to public safety. The restrictions virtually removed that threat while 
preserving the religious right to bear the symbol (Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-
Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6, [2006] 1 SCR 256).  
This decision by the Supreme Court of Canada has spread farther than the Kirpan in the 
school environment and beyond the borders of Canada itself. The decision is not only 
accommodating of sections 2a and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), but 
also Article 18 of two separate United Nations documents: the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), both of which 
Canada has signed and ratified (Barnett, 2.1). These two United Nations documents parallel 
sections 2a and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) (refer to Appendix A 
for the respective texts of the United Nations documents). As such, the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada regarding the Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys case can be 
seen as informative in the interpretation of both the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(1982) context and in the context of these international rights documents.  
The Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys case pitted against each other 
sections 2a and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) with regards to the 
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Kirpan and public safety. The Kirpan is a religious necessity for baptized Sikhs, but with the 
religious affiliation removed it becomes a simple weapon that is dangerous to public safety. 
Stipulations can be placed on the Kirpan, which entertain the concerns raised by section 7, and 
uphold the rights under section 2a of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) as 
well as Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and International 
Convent on Civil and Political Rights (1966). To Sikhs, it is a sacred duty not to use the Kirpan 
in aggression and only to defend another person in a life or death situation (Singh et al., 2016, p. 
29). However, relying on simple reasonable faith to prevent the misuse of such articles of faith 
cannot be allowed, as the actions of an individual are unpredictable and may cause severe harm 
to another as well as to the notion of safety in society. In addition to the conditions placed on the 
Kirpan by the Supreme Court of Canada, a restriction should be added that the Kirpan be welded 
shut or riveted to its original sheath and that sheathed Kirpan be placed within the manifold 
security measures upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada to render the Kirpan completely 
useless in a confrontation. It is the duty of a Sikh to fight against aggression, oppression and to 
protect the weak. As the tenth Sikh Guru, Guru Gobind Singh Ji stated, “[i]f all other peaceful 
means failed to uproot tyranny then it was right to take up the sword” (Bedi, 1968, verse 22).  
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Appendix A 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Article 18 
 
[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance (Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Article 18).   
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Article 18 
 
Article 18 – Sections 1 and 2 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall 
include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either 
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.   
2. No one shall be subject to coercion, which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion or belief of his choice (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Article 
18).  
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RYAN KINGHORN 
LS 403 - SOCIO-LEGAL RESPONSES TO CRIME 
 
The “War on Drugs” is the common expression used when explaining the prevailing response to 
drug offenses in Western society. From the mid-1900s to present-day, a tough on crime approach has been 
adopted as the primary response for dealing with non-violent illegal drug offenses. The United States 
initiated this war and has been the dominant actor in pursuing, advancing, and influencing policy toward 
the criminalization of various substances used around the world. As with most aspects of the United States’ 
economic and political culture, the country has had a significant effect on global drug policies, responses, 
and enforcement, especially in other western neoliberal societies like Canada and the UK. The United States 
has led the international movement for “tough on crime” drug policies, fuelled by the legacy of colonialism 
and in the interests of capitalist globalization (Reynolds, 2008). Recent drug abuse discourse has made it 
quite apparent that these traditional methods of dealing with the issues surrounding drugs has been rapidly 
feeding an increasingly oppressive, corrupt, and unproductive neo-liberal criminal justice system.  
This paper will discuss the formation of the war on drugs, what has become of the originally “good 
intentioned” response, and identify the sources of this corrupt system. In examining the controlling, 
oppressive, and racialized legacy of colonialism, this paper will demonstrate that the tough on crime 
structure, regardless of its original intention, has evolved in the interest of a capitalist society constantly 
seeking tools for sustaining systematic control and inequality. In failing to achieve the goal of eradicating 
drug production, use, and addiction, the state has successfully achieved its consistent subconscious 
objective of racialization, control and power (Cummings, 2012). To recognize the racialization of drug 
abuse in the western world, this essay uses critical race theory as a mechanism of explanation and 
A REIMAGINED RESPONSE TO DRUG OFFENSES IN THE 
WESTERN WORLD 
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connection to the war on drugs. The concluding section of the paper will describe and analyze a reimagined 
response to the war on drugs, one that responds to abuse socially and medically rather than criminally. By 
using the case of Portugal’s 20th century drug reform, it will become clear that many countries, including 
Canada and the United States, have the moral responsibility to end this destructive war. With an increasing 
number of non-violent populations in prisons, lobbying toward prison privatization and proliferation 
(Cummings, 2012), continued politicization of “tough on crime” philosophies, and evolving systematic 
inequality, this topic is more important than ever in North America and needs to be addressed promptly. As 
the United States have taken the war on drugs to a level that is arguably irreparable, Canada, however, still 
has the opportunity to solve this issue by decriminalizing many of these banned substances in order to aid 
some of the underlying social problems surrounding drug abuse. 
The War on Drugs 
In considering these tough on crime responses to social and legal issues, it is not the responses to 
crimes such as murder, rape, assault, and robbery that most people are questioning, but the non-violent 
offenses, most of which are drug-related. With the majority of violent crimes decreasing in Western 
countries over the last few decades, it is fascinating to recognize the state’s capacity to transform policies 
in order to continue nourishing capitalism and authority through punitive systems. The “prison industrial 
complex”, a phrase discussed frequently in drug crime discourse, is the proliferation of punitive institutions 
due to their ability to increase profits for corporations and wealthy elites (Cummings, 2012). The war on 
drugs has normalized and legitimized the mass incarceration of citizens. This social atrocity is clearly 
exhibited in the most basic of crime statistics, with the most obvious one being the fact that the United 
States having roughly 5% of the world’s population, but almost 25% of the world’s prisoners (Cummings, 
2012). With an astonishing proportion of prisoners in North American prison cells because of non-violent 
drug offenses, it is clear that the war on drugs is driving a very lucrative business. One of the major 
contributions to this corrupt system has been the implementation of private prisons, something that is 
predominately an American issue, but has gained attention throughout Canada in recent years. Prison 
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privatization is one of the most disturbing aspects of the prison-industrial complex, as it directly contributes 
to an asymmetrical capitalist system (Reynolds, 2008). The privatized prison effort is one that boosts 
industries and generates profit via the war on drugs, combining private economic spheres with public issues.  
The Economization of Non-Economical Spheres 
One of the major tragedies of neoliberal drug response policies has been its capacity to be 
manipulated by capitalist interests. As described by Wendy Browns in her book, Undoing the Demos: 
Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution, the forces of neoliberalism have economized non-economical spheres 
of society (Brown, 2015). The criminal justice system in Western countries has initiated an interweaving 
of private business and government interests in connection with incarcerating citizens (Cummings, 2012). 
Violent crime rates have steadily decreased over the past several decades, yet incarceration rates have 
rapidly increased due the benefits it brings to corporations, enterprises, investors and wealthy elites looking 
to extract enormous profits from business ventures, regardless of ethically responsible considerations. 
Corporations and investors are engaged in building, equipping and operating prisons as well as employing 
prisoners for cheap work, similar to third world labor (Cummings, 2012). Neoliberalism has effectively 
converted the political character, meaning, and operation of democratic elements into economic ones 
controlled by private entities (Brown, 2015). Our legal system, founded on the core values of justice, the 
rule of law, and responsible government has become a system controlled by those with ulterior intentions. 
The recent evolution of the criminal justice system is examined in both David Garland and Loic Wacquant’s 
articles commenting on the rapid shifts in crime responses in recent years. Similar to Brown’s claim, 
Wacquant views the expansion of the penal sector through state-constructed legitimations “an essential 
element of its new anatomy in the age of economic neo-Darwinism” (Wacquant, 2008). Furthermore, 
Garland believes that these evolving practices in policing, prosecution, sentencing and penal sanctioning 
are in pursuit of new neoliberal objectives, which embody an economically focused interest (Garland, 
2001). In addition to the subconscious objective of freeing up capitalist markets through crime policy and 
privatization, the war on drugs has also remained consistent to the racialized legacy of the Western colonial 
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state.  
Critical Race Theory, The War on Drugs, and the Legacy of Colonialism 
Systematic racism is deeply rooted in the war on drugs, pursuing the state’s historically racist and 
oppressive character. Much of what can be understood in the analysis of drug policy and racism is through 
critical race theory. Critical race theory is the critique of Western society and culture regarding the 
intersectionality between race, law and power (Gomez, 2004). Critical race theory focuses on racial 
ideologies, inequalities and identity, all which have been influenced by the legacy of colonialism. In a 
Western society dominated by American neoliberalism, the legal system does not exist apart from race, and 
race is deeply rooted in the law (Gomez, 2014). Racialization is a product of society and as stated by Gomez, 
“racial classifications are historically contingent, the product of political contestation… and are dynamic 
rather than fixed or essential” (Gomez 2014, p. 457). Racial classifications and policies evolving from the 
colonial era have indeed changed, but are still deeply engrained in the subconscious of both the legal system 
as well as its participants. The legal system is grounded in ideologies, and like most ideologies, they evolve 
over time in order to serve elitist power relations. Drug policies have been framed as being formally neutral, 
just, and necessary, but it is important to understand how these ideological changes are continuing to 
assisting social inequalities set in place to sustain the social hierarchies (Ewick 2004, 84). As Patricia Ewick 
explains in her piece, Consciousness and Ideology, the state is able to develop in its citizens a “false 
consciousness” through various formal strategies within the legal system that block the greater population 
from recognizing the system for how it really is (Ewick, 2004). Based on this argument, it is understood 
that just because the laws have changed to appear less racialized and more equal, does not mean that our 
legal system has lost its racist nature. This systematic phenomenon is clearly exhibited in the neoliberal war 
on drugs.  
The War on Drugs and Racialized Communities 
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The primary point of concern with the war on drugs has been its unproductive disservice to 
democratic societies. The war on drugs has failed to solve drug related issues and has torn communities 
apart along the way. As noted previously, the war on drugs is greatly racialized and lurks on marginalized 
members of society. As discussed by Mumia Abu-Jamal and Johanna Fernández in their controversial 
article about prison abolition, neoliberal governments responded to the 20th century civil rights movement 
with a frenzied reaction to equal rights. With minority rights granted and equality progressed, the ruling 
class lost a great deal of power and control. With this loss of power, the state turned to incarceration to gain 
back their dominant colonial position. It was at that moment the state recognized the potential for drug 
criminalization to aid their crusade against the marginalized. Drugs were (and still are) very familiar to low-
income and minority communities. Moreover, these communities have high vulnerability and little 
influence on how their country’s criminal justice system is to be operated. In 1971, United States President 
Richard Nixon named drug abuse “public enemy number one”, and so began the domino effect of drug 
policy after drug policy, all trumping the other with tough on crime policies (Cummings, 2012).  
 The rationale of the war on drugs has recklessly assumed that there is a direct correlation between 
drug addiction and crime. States around the world soon followed the United States’ model and harshly 
criminalized drug abuse. This led to a rapid change in criminal justice systems and led to a hyper-
incarceration of marginalized populations (Abu-Jamal & Fernández, 2014). The 20th century war on drugs 
became primarily a way to incarcerate non-violent drug offenders from disadvantaged minority 
populations. Irregular law enforcement, military-style responses, and vicious stereotypes quickly evolved 
and became systematic norms, triggering a wide acceptance of increased incarceration rates, particularly in 
African-American and Latino populations (Cummings, 2012).  
As of 2013, there were almost half-a-million Americans in prison for drug offenses (Odeh, 2013). 
Of this population, roughly 65% were of African-American or Latino decent (Cummings, 2012). 
Furthermore, the war on drugs has had a ruthless effect on female imprisonment. Forty thousand American 
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female prisoners were incarcerated for drug-related offences in 1980, and by 2003 that number increased 
to over four hundred thousand (Mauer, 2003). As claimed by Marylee Reynolds, the war on drugs directly 
triggered the 20th century explosion of female imprisonment in neoliberal societies (Reynolds, 2008). In the 
year 1980, roughly 4% of all American prisoners were female, and by 2006 the war on drugs had helped 
this number grow to over 7% (Reynolds, 2008). Consistent with male prisoner statistics, women of colour 
became disproportionally overrepresented in drug crimes (Reynolds, 2008). As some of these statistics are 
over a decade old, it can be assumed that these numbers are just as accurate today, as there has been little 
done to tackle the inequalities and racialization grounded in the war on drugs.  
The racialization of disadvantaged minorities through the war on drugs has had a negative effect on 
individuals, families, and entire communities. Since the late 20th century, racialized communities struck 
with poverty and violence have been further brutalized by the war on drugs. The response to drug crimes 
has led to mass incarceration, structural poverty, systematic asymmetry, economic burdens on communities, 
and a lack of familial structure for hundreds of thousands of people (Cummings, 2012). Many people 
assume that the majority of injustices surrounding the war on drugs are mainly American issues, and while 
the situation has become quite extreme in the United States, it is still very relevant in Canadian society. For 
example, in 2011, black prisoners in Canada “accounted for 9% of the federal prison population” even 
though the black population made up only 2.5% of the overall Canadian populace (Wortley & Owusu-
Bempah, 2011). Reynolds accurately describes the United States’ ability to expand their tough on crime 
drug ideologies globally through their international hegemonic status and authority (Reynolds, 2008). The 
global spread of the war on drugs has influenced both Canadian drug policies as well as the racialized 
discrimination involved in the war. Akwatu Khenti notes that the war on drugs has intensified the “systemic 
historical, political, social and economic process whereby black men who have long been stereotyped as 
criminals are now targeted as the enemy… regardless of the involvement of other racial communities” 
(Khenti, 2013). Racial profiling has become the reality for black males in Canada, due to the war on drugs’ 
social construct of the black male ganger and drug dealer (Cummings, 2012). Thousands of social minorities 
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are discriminated against and abused daily in the United States, Canada, and in other Western societies due 
to the negative connotations that have evolved as a result of this war and the state’s colonial nature. 
Drug Abuse in the 21st Century 
Like alcohol prohibition in the early 1900s, the prohibition of drugs has been completely ineffective 
in its objectives. By treating drug abuse as a criminal matter, the war on drugs has completely missed the 
point on how to deal with such an issue. The United Nations has estimated that the global drug trade is 
worth more than $320 billion, with over 200 million people using “illegal” drugs around the world (United 
Nations, 2012). It is not a debate on whether our strict criminalization of drugs and tough punishment of 
drug offenders has even slightly eradicated the drug industry. Making drugs illegal is not stopping the 
production, use, and addiction to drugs in Canada, the United States, or around the world. As a matter of 
fact, the United States, with some of the harshest drug laws in the world, is also the world’s leader in illegal 
drug use (Warner, 2008). The debate on drug laws is not one that is trying to undermine the harmful social, 
mental, and physical effects that drugs can have on its consumers.  It is undeniable that many drugs have 
serious and even detrimental effects on their consumers. The goals of the war on drugs and the goals of 
drug decriminalization are the same: protecting our kids, educating society, protecting public safety, 
repairing systematic inequalities, and preventing and treating drug abuse and addiction (Branson, 2012). In 
addition to the irreparable social damages the war on drugs has done, this response to drugs has evidently 
driven the industry into a dark and underground trade, led by cartels, gangs, and other dangerous individuals 
and groups. These are not the people we want to have access to $300+ billion. If any of this is going to 
change, society needs to ignore the capitalist engine driving the oppressive legal subconscious and 
understand that illegal drugs are not a criminal issue, but a social and medical issue that can be resolved 
through more rational methods and responses.  
A Reimagined Response to Drug Offenses  
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Although some scholars make persuasive claims in support of absolute prison abolishment, 
realistically it is not a rational or feasible response to most crimes. The prison system has many legitimate 
and just qualities that benefit the greater good of society. That being said, non-violent drug offenders do 
not belong in the same place as violent or dangerous offenders. What can be taken from Mumia Abu-Jamal 
and Johanna Fernández’s ideas and applied to reimagining the war on drugs however is their call for 
community revitalization programs and dynamic rehabilitation becoming mainstream (Mumia Abu-Jamal 
& Johanna Fernández, 2014). The war on drugs has devastated far too many lives in the United States, 
Canada, and around the world. Social priorities need to shift from economic ones motivated by wealth, to 
social ones motivated by fairness. As examined by many academics and researchers, it is going to be a near-
impossible task to successfully tackle the systematic inequalities induced by neoliberalism (Brown, 2015). 
Moreover, there are many additional social inequalities progressing through neoliberalism that need to be 
dealt with above and beyond the war on drugs. The war on drugs is just one of these issues, but it is in fact 
an issue that appears to have a more realistic chance at being reimagined and revolutionized than other 
systematic injustices.  
The reimagined alternative to the dominant legal response to the war on drugs is not a simple one. 
The key element of the drug revolution is the social reconstruction of illegal drug abuse. A systematic and 
social reframing of drug abuse from a criminal problem to a social and/or medical problem is necessary. 
Instead of treating drug users and addicts as moral delinquents, the responses need to be developed with a 
better understanding of the social and medical roots related to drug abuse. Although Canada has taken many 
steps to reform drug responses, as examined in The Benevolent Watch: Therapeutic Surveillance in Drug 
Treatment Court (Moore, 2011), there are still many significant steps the nation could be taking to end the 
damaging war on drugs. Fortunately, Canada can learn by example by adopting some of the various 
alternatives that have been implemented by other Western countries, recognizing the unproductive nature 
of the war as well as its damaging social effects.  
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 Portugal is the prime example of how neoliberal countries ought to deal with the issue of drug 
abuse. In 2001, Portugal adopted laws and procedures that almost completely eliminate jail time for most 
drug offenses (Drug Policy Alliance, 2015).  While completely legalizing some drugs violates United 
Nations policies, Portugal has decided to simply decriminalize most drugs. Non-violent individuals caught 
with a relatively small amount of illegal drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, or heroin receive a 
misdemeanour charge similar to a parking ticket (Hollersen, 2013). As it is evident in countries like Canada 
and the United States that the criminalization of drugs is doing a disservice to society, the same was 
identified in Portugal. At the start of the new millennium, Portugal decided to “pave a new path” by 
decriminalizing drugs of all kinds in order to improve national public safety and health (Hollersen, 2013). 
The Portuguese government consulted crime and drug statistics and accepted the fact that that the issue of 
drug abuse was to be framed as a public health one, not a criminal one. Portugal now deems drug abusers 
as being sick, rather than delinquent, and has thus stopped treating them as criminals. That being said, drugs 
are still illegal in Portugal. When an individual is caught with a drug possession lower than the legal limit, 
they are required to attend the “warning commission on drug addiction” where a panel consisting of three 
members (usually a lawyer or a judge, a doctor, and a psychologist) have three options: recommend 
treatment, levy a small fine, or do nothing. Counseling is in fact the most common approach (Cummings, 
2012). On the other hand, when an individual is caught with a drug possession higher than the legal limit, 
they are presumed to be a drug dealer and are summoned to criminal court to be dealt with in accordance 
to mainstream drug charges. (Hollersen, 2013).  
As stated by João Goulão, the Portuguese drug czar and key influencer of these new policies, “our 
most important duty is to invite people to participate in rehab”…“Decriminalization is pointless without 
being accompanied by prevention programs, drug clinics and social work conducted directly on the streets” 
(Hollersen, 2013). That is exactly the main objective in ending the war on drugs. Having a healthier, more 
equal, and less mistreated population should be the highest priority of a truly responsible government. As 
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it is noted below, refusing to surrender to the forces of capitalism and abolishing the war on drugs can have 
significant benefits that clearly outweigh the costs.  
In 2015, almost a decade and a half after the Portuguese drug reform, the Drug Policy Alliance, a 
non-profit organization dedicated to ending the global war on drugs, developed a report on the effects such 
policy changes have had on Portuguese society. First, their research found that there is no major increase 
in the use of drugs among the population. This should not come as a surprise due to the fact that drugs are 
as accessible as they have ever been around the world and people will continue to do drugs, regardless of 
whether they are legal. Secondly, the researchers found the rate of Portuguese minors abusing drugs to be 
decreasing, which is a very positive social change. Third, there has been a substantial decrease in the amount 
of citizens arrested and incarcerated for drugs. This is one of the most problematic elements of the reform 
for North American countries, as it directly competes with the neoliberal prison-industrial complex 
mentioned earlier. Unfortunately, the reality in countries such as Canada and the United States is that 
politicians are highly influenced by corporate profiteers, the ones whom are profiting greatly from the war 
on drugs and mass incarceration (Cummings, 2012). Because of this capitalist corruption, it will be much 
harder in countries like these to mobilize, lobby, and influence effective drug reform. Nevertheless, other 
remarkable findings from the Portugal Drug Policy Alliance study are that there has been less drug-induced 
deaths, more citizens seeking rehabilitation, lower rates of new HIV infections, and a significant amount of 
money saved by the state. The decriminalization of drugs has the ability to transfer the tax dollars from law 
enforcement and courtrooms to rehabilitation and education. 
These are all very critical social enhancements that could easily be mirrored in a country such as 
Canada. With more liberal ideologies, welfare objectives, and much less corporate influence than the 
neighboring U.S., Canada could easily be the next western society to end the war on drugs. Despite the 
forces of neoliberalism, there is still hope in both Canada and the United States. In Canada, newly elected 
Prime Minster Justin Trudeau has been very open about his views on drug decriminalization and increasing 
social assistances programs such as rehabilitation (Glenny, 2015). On the American side, Democratic 
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candidate Bernie Sanders has been gaining a great deal of popularity and publicity due to his revolutionary 
visions of what the United States can be by adopting socialist values. As a self-proclaimed socialist, Sanders 
believes that the United States needs a bold change in the criminal justice system and a productive first step 
would be to “start treating prisoners as human beings, not profiting from their incarceration (Bernie 2016, 
2015).  
The war on drugs has done a lasting disservice to western society. Fuelled by the colonial legacy 
of hatred and greed, this war has economized non-economical social spheres, further racialized populations, 
destroyed communities, and hyper-incarcerated innocent victims of a mental medical illness. With Portugal 
being a prime example of how a government should respect its citizens and care for their wellbeing, the 
war on drugs must be ended in Canada and around the world immediately.  
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Prominent legal feminists, like Catherine MacKinnon, have promoted an understanding of 
rape, when it occurs during time of war and is targeted towards women, as constituting the crime 
of genocide. Thus an understanding of rape as genocide has been used by Mackinnon and others 
to call for intervention and recognition (MacKinnon, 1994) (Mackinnon C., 2006) Therefore, one 
of the most critical shifts in international law and human rights policy is the recognition that sexual 
violence is not merely incidental to war, but in fact an integral aspect of the conflict.  For instance, 
the conceptualization of rape as genocide, and as a weapon of war, has taken on legal significance. 
At the International Criminal Justice tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia rape has been prosecuted 
as a crime against humanity and genocide (Engle, 2007). Thus, the rise of international criminal 
law and its subsequent tribunals have been revered as effective mechanisms to prosecuting 
gendered acts of sexual violence that arise in the context of war, thus bringing attention to its 
victims (Engle, 2007). In this essay, through the judgments of the International Criminal Justice’s 
(ICJ), I examine how its tribunals reflect an understanding of rape as an instrument of the 
genocide.  I argue that the discourse of ‘rape as a weapon of war’, and the instrumentalization of 
sexual violence as being natural in an ethnic conflict, paradoxically makes the victims of violence 
largely invisible. In a sense, international law has reductionist logic in terms of what can be 
understood about the form of impact on the victims of gendered sexual violence, and its role in the 
PROSECUTING GENDERED VIOLENCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: THE PARADOX OF WARTIME VIOLENCE 
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genocide. I demonstrate how ‘rape as a weapon of war’ renders both male and female victims of 
violence in war invisible. 
When prosecuting gendered violence, the tribunal’s choice of recalling the “facts” of the 
account of sexual violence, of the victims, becomes about locating the violence as occurring in the 
realm of the larger inter-ethnic conflict. In this dominant narrative, of inter-ethnic conflict, men 
from one ethnic group are understood as subjecting women from another ethnic group to sexual 
abuse. The Rwandan genocide occurred over a period of three months, commencing on 6th April 
1994, when the plane carrying Rwandan President Habyarimana was shot down, as it approached 
Kigali. The early events leading to the genocide began in 1990 when the Rwanda Patriotic Force 
(RPF), an army of expatriate Rwandans primarily of the Tutsi but also of the Hutu group, occupied 
Rwanda from Uganda. The consequential civil war continued throughout the early 1990s and 
became a significant “backdrop to the genocide” (Buss 147). The Rwandan genocide finished in 
July 1994 when government forces left the country and coerced more than a million Rwandan 
civilians to depart with them (Buss, 2009). In the hundred days of the genocide, an estimated 
800,000 Rwandans, primarily Tutsi were massacred.  
The United Nations Security Council in November 1994 created The International 
Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, which was similar in function to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Yugoslavia (ICTY). The tribunal was established Arusha, Tanzania to hold those individuals 
accountable who had organized and participated in the genocide, and thus were liable for engaging 
in a crime against humanity.  The Rwandan Tribunal discovered that sexual violence was prevalent 
throughout Rwanda and ‘‘were committed with the speciﬁc intent to destroy, in whole or in part, 
a particular group’’ (Buss, 2009, p. 151), primarily the Tutsi ethnic group. Furthermore, the 
tribunal stated the violence led to bodily and mental harm of women of Tutsi descent, their families 
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and the Tutsi community as a whole. Hence rape was an essential tactic employed in this civil 
conflict and was targeted at Tutsi women, to ensure destruction of the Tutsi group (Buss, 2009) 
Significantly then, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as a post-
conflict mechanism can be seen as a site that utilizes a reductionist narrative for explaining 
women’s experiences of armed conflict. In this narrative, sexual violence is understood as 
occurring because ‘Hutu men who raped Tutsi women [did so] as a means to destroy the Tutsi 
community’ (Buss 160).  
Hence, as seen in the Rwanda Tribunal, at post-conflict trials the prosecution of rape 
becomes inherently connected to the larger context of violence: that is rape as a crime against 
humanity or rape as genocide. In other words, sexual assault in armed conflict, then, to be 
prosecuted under international law needs to be reflected as having occurred as ‘‘part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial 
or religious grounds’’ (Buss, 2009, p. 150).  Rape as genocide requires that the act of rape was 
‘‘committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group’’ (Buss, p. 150). Under both crimes, rape is “a crime against a collectivity” (Buss, p. 
150).  Hence, while rape as an offence in international law is recognized as constituting an “act of 
sexual violence against an individual”, it largely becomes constructed as harm against humanity 
through the prevailing ‘rape as genocide’ discourse; here the physical harm is viewed as targeting 
a community (Buss, 2009, p. 150).  In other words, the victim of sexual violence is re-categorized 
as a particular victim whose suffering denotes a communal narrative of pain (Buss, 2009).  
For instance, the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) found Mikaeli 
Muhimana who was a counsellor in Kibuye, western Rwanda, guilty of partaking in and abetting 
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rape as a crime against humanity. The Tribunal declared in its decision that the sexual violence 
occurred subsequently as a ‘‘discriminatory, widespread attack’’ against ‘‘a group of Tutsi 
civilians in Gishyita Commune, between the months of April and June 1994” (Buss, p. 150). 
Muhimana was convicted for having engaged in “acts of rape against women he believed were 
Tutsi” (Buss, 2009, p. 150).  However, it is irrelevant whether the women Muhimana raped were 
actually Tutsi, what matters is that he engaged in sexual violence against them knowing the 
violence constituted a “widespread and systematic attack’’ (Buss, 2009, p. 150) on an identifiable 
ethnic group i.e. the Tutsi community.  Hence the Tribunal found Muhimana ‘‘criminally liable 
for committing and abetting the rapes charged, as part of a widespread and systematic attack 
against a civilian population’’, that is, a crime against humanity (Buss, p. 150). Furthermore, in 
the much praised first decision in Akayesu, the Tribunal found that rapes were widespread, the 
accused knew of and aided and abetted in the rapes, and hence they ‘‘were committed with the 
specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group’’, namely the Tutsi. The Tribunal 
held that the rapes led to the "physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families 
and their communities" (Buss, 2009, p. 151).  The destruction of the Tutsi community was seen as 
occurring specifically through the sexual victimization of the Tutsi women (Buss, 2009).  
Therefore, the Tribunal held that rape was used to commit the crime of genocide. The 
Rwanda Tribunal’s recognition that rape in the Rwandan Genocide “was a crime against humanity 
and/or an integral part of the genocide” resonates with several feminist theorists who reflect upon 
rape and other forms of wartime sexual violence “as instrumental to the larger conflict” (Buss, 
2009, p. 151). Locating rape at the centre of the conflict—as an integral element of the violence—
is an important effort which allows us to recognize that violence is indeed gendered in nature. 
However, without minimizing the impact of communal suffering as a result of sexual violence, it 
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is imperative to examine how this inter-ethnic narrative of sexual violence conveys “a limited 
conception of harm and the complex dimensions of violence” (Buss, 2009, p. 151) rendering 
invisible the various conditions that expose women to violence, and the distinct ways they take to 
negotiate, resist and cope with sexual abuse and death. 
Feminist scholarship and activism have effectively reflected the manner in which rape 
narratives have served as propaganda for constructing shifting conceptions of national self-
identity. More significantly, feminists and legal feminists have long been aware of the impact of 
calling particular situation genocide-or at least ethnic cleansing or a mass human rights violation. 
Invoking such language allowed feminists, for instance Catherine MacKinnon, Susan Brownmiller 
and Beverly Allen, to draw attention to rape as part of the overall violence, targeting a community, 
and as a result signaled that international legal recognition and military intervention needed to be 
implemented to prosecute violations of women’s rights matter (MacKinnon, 1994) (Brownmiller, 
1975) (Allen, 1996). Although these feminists were not primarily responsible for these 
interventions, they did play a crucial influence in advocating intervention for wartime sexual 
violence against women and thus for rape as genocide discourse. For instance, discussions 
regarding violence in Darfur showed how rape began to be spoken alongside and rather indistinctly 
from genocide to advocate for international criminal law intervention. The more rape was viewed 
as genocidal, the more those calling for international criminal law intervention invoked rape as a 
justification. However, speaking and framing of rape in this way frequently shifts the focus away 
from the specific harm to women as a gender and instead serves to reflect the collective harm 
experienced in the Inter-ethnic conflict. (Engle, 2007). Despite the many visibilities of wartime 
sexual violence, violence against women in war continues to be generally invisible “as a matter of 
political and legal urgency” (Buss, 2009, p. 154).  Below, I demonstrate there is a relationship 
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between rape that becomes hyper- visible, and “rendered paradigmatic’, and rape and sexual 
violence that consequently becomes invisible (Buss, 2009, p. 154).  
According to sociologist Avery Gordon, hyper-visibility is the phenomena that becomes 
the ‘‘persistent alibi for the mechanisms that render one un-visible’’ (Gordon, 1997).  Hence 
hyper-visibility then acts as a smokescreen to obscure the very existence of un-visibility. Clearly, 
discussing wartime sexual violence as being hyper-visible might instantly seem controversial and 
rather peculiar, especially when given the fact the Rwanda Tribunal’s record on sexual violence 
reflects the strikingly low conviction rate for rape or sexual violence (Buss, 2009). While 
international law’s invocation of rape as a weapon for genocide and as a signifier of atrocity is 
well intended, such an emphasis is problematic as it as a ‘homogenising’ tendency to construct 
sexual violence as inevitable in war. Hence this homogenisation obscures the individual accounts 
of rape victims. The result is that while violence against women and gender inequality is made 
visible and treated seriously within international law, it is a partial visibility. Ultimately, women 
appear and function in these decisions to reinforce “borders of group identity” (Buss, The Curious 
Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal Law, 2007, p. 13). For 
instance, the Furundzija (1995) case was significant for being the “first war crimes prosecution in 
which rape and sexual assault was the single charge” (Campbell, 2002, p. 150), and thus provided 
the first definition of the elements of the crime of rape in international humanitarian law, reflecting 
how a victim’s experience of sexual violence can only find space if it is recalled in a way to 
reinforce the community-conflict narrative recognized by law (Campbell, 2002). The judgment in 
Furundzija affirmed that rape in armed conflict is a public wrong. Of course, normatively 
speaking, the acknowledgment of rape as not a crime against an individual, but rather a crime 
against humanity and hence a public wrong occurred because it constituted a violation “of 
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universally accepted norms of international law” (Campbell, 2002, p. 155). This was essential in 
the Furundzija case because without this recognition the prosecution could not take place and there 
could no visibility of sexual assault in law.  
However, it is important to observe the significant distinction between the social space in 
which the individual experience of violence occurs “and the contemporary space in which it is (or 
is not) recalled” (Campbell, 2002, p. 155). Hence, victims of wartime sexual violence, in order to 
have their experiences represented and recognized at trial, are expected to speak of the violence in 
a way that ‘weaves’ fact into a community’s identity. In other words, a victim’s individual memory 
becomes transformed in international law as “collective memory” (Campbell, 2002, p. 155). 
Consequently, “collective memory survives and individual memory can find a place [, otherwise] 
it vanishes from collective memory and the possibility for individual memory is severely strained” 
(Campbell, 2002, p. 155). 
The individual narratives of victims become invisible partially because of the way crimes 
are defined and categorized in international law. Hence, the categorisation of war crimes under 
humanitarian law does not merely reflect and recognise the acts as having criminal intent, it offers 
a ‘grammar of pain’ (Buss, 2009, p. 155), i.e. a distinct and uniform language by which the tribunal 
can identify, and witnesses are permitted to testify to, their stories of violence. Consequently, this 
categorisation of rape as a crime against humanity and as genocide, and the grammar of pain 
certain determine which types of narratives are recognized in court and which are excluded, and 
thus also which subjects are permitted to speak of the harms they have incurred (Buss, 2009). 
In international law the communal narratives triumph over the individual narrative and 
memory of the victim becomes possible through the grammar of pain. This grammar of pain is 
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inherently gendered and consequently provides rules and structures to assign people to positions 
within a script of violence. Through this script of violence, rape and sexual violence comes to be 
constructed as a material aspect of women’s lives and thus are seen as being inevitable. The 
victimized female subject and her violator are situated in this script of violence and they 
subsequently emerge with their identities reconstructed to conform to the communal narrative of 
inter-ethnic conflict. Hence, in the script of violence created by the grammar of pain of 
international law, gender inequality becomes neutralized and women are then subjects who are 
‘inherently rapeable’ (Marcus, 1992, p. 388).  Thus, sexual violence is constructed as an instrument 
that ‘one side’ picks up and uses against the ‘other side’. In the scripted communal narrative, rape 
follows from the very existence of conflicts understood as occurring between two polarised ‘sides’. 
The prominence of the ‘grammar of pain’ and the violence script in international criminal law is 
reflected in the Rwandan Tribunal recognition of rape as an instrument of genocide. In this context, 
identities-males and females, Hutu and Tutsi groups- are placed into particular positions within 
the violent script and thus reconstructed through fixed and stable categories of victim and 
aggressor (Buss, 2009).  
The Rwandan Tribunal’s narrative of the rape script where Hutu men raped Tutsi women 
as a way to destroy the Tutsi community, while not inaccurate, provides an incomplete account of 
the genocide and sexual violence. In the following discussion I reflect how difficulty arises in 
accepting this narrative when we begin to examine who are seen as victims and who aren’t, how 
violence against women is rooted in pre-conflict sexual and gender relations, and the resistance 
victims of wartime sexual violence demonstrate (Buss, 2009). The judgment in the Gacumbitsi 
case depicts some of the dynamics involved in seeing wartime sexual violence through the 
communal narrative that focuses on the ethnic dimensions of a conflict.  The former may of 
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Rusumo in Eastern Rwanda Sylvestre Gacumbitsi was convicted for his contribution in 
orchestrating and participating in murder, rape, and extermination in the Rusumo commune during 
April, May and June 1994. Hence he was tried by the Rwandan Tribunal for genocide and crimes 
against humanity (Buss, 2007). This case reflects the reductionist logic inherent in international 
law’s construction of wartime sexual violence. The logic is firstly reductionist in nature due to its 
preoccupation of fixed or stable categories of victim and aggressor. More significantly, because 
there is a greater distortion at work in judgments like Gacumbitsi as they are partially explained 
by the overemphasis on ethnic affiliation as the dominant narrative within which the events in 
Rwanda are understood, which silences the individual narrative and memory of the victim.  
Individual Responsibility in International Law  
It is the commonly held belief that international criminal law, with its emphasis on 
individual criminal responsibility, is the suitable solution and mechanism to provide justice for 
instances of mass violence. Hence, when international criminal trials take on instances of mass 
violence, they are first and foremost a mechanism for establishing individual criminal 
responsibility for that violence (more precisely, they determine responsibility for specific acts or 
omissions defined as constituting war crimes). In this context, one or more individuals are 
apprehended for violating principles of international criminal law. The post-conflict criminal trial 
represents an “effort to fix individual responsibility for history’s violent march” (Krever, 2013). 
Hence, the focus on individual criminal responsibility is widely understood not as a limitation of 
international criminal law, but as a key strength. However, as I reflect below, when contextualized, 
the doctrine of individual criminal responsibility contributes to rendering violence invisible 
(Krever, 2013, p. 712).  
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Previously, perpetrators of mass violence could use the notion of state sovereignty as a 
justification for their actions.  Sovereignty as a legal concept allowed state leaders, under the 
principle of self-determination to govern their state in a manner they thought best, without any 
international or political interference.  However, such sovereignty of states has become qualified 
with the emergence of the “the new universalized rule of law” (Krever, 2013, p. 712) which is 
meant to regulate the actions of those state leaders who use their power to violate established 
international norms, regardless of whether or not they have chosen to adhere to such norms by 
formally becoming a member to an international law treaty. Thus this “universalized rule of law” 
represents “‘a moral conquest over the sovereign indifference of cold leviathans’” (Krever, 2013, 
p. 712) 
In the Gacumbitsi case, the Tribunal considered charges relating both to the defendant's 
role as an authority figure organizing murder, rape, and genocide, and his own role in individual 
acts of rape and murder. A critical aspect of the evidence was a speech the defendant gave on 17 
April 1994, in which he encouraged “the men of Rusumo to have sex with Tutsi ‘girls’ and, should 
the women refuse, to kill them ‘in an atrocious manner’” (Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime 
Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal Law, p. 13).  There were two distinct 
difficulties that arose for the Tribunal in Gacumbitisi that need to be reflected upon. The first 
difficulty concerned his role for the rapes that occurred around the time of his speech; however, 
the Tribunal in Rwanda was unable to find complete evidence to convict him on the basis of such 
charges. These charges involved the rapes of witnesses ‘TAO’, ‘TAS’, ‘TAP’ and ‘TAP's mother’ 
(Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal 
Law, 2007, p. 13).  The defendant Gacumbitsi was eventually acquitted for the said charges.  He 
was found not responsible for the rape of these witnesses, because there was a lack of evidence 
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linking his speech to the sexual violence; the prosecution could not establish a co-relation between 
the defendant's specific acts of encouragement on 17th April 1994 and the rapes of these women, 
all of which occurred near mid-April” (Buss, 2007). However, the tribunal did find that rapes of 
other women and girls did occur due to his speech as they occurred immediately after his 
“utterances” (Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International 
Criminal Law, 2007, p. 14).  
The second difficulty, which is also difficult to reconcile, in this decision concerns one of 
above mentioned witness; ‘TAS’ who was actually a Hutu woman but was married to a Tutsi man. 
In her testimony she reported she was raped by two Hutu men while attempting to find a place to 
hide. One of her attackers stated that the defendant had given them orders to engage in sexual 
violence only against Tutsi women and girls, and that nothing had been decided regarding Hutu 
women married to Tutsi men. Yet these two men raped ‘TAS’ anyway. The ethnicity of ‘TAS’ 
becomes important here. Given she was of Hutu descent and not officially part of the Tutsi 
population; this challenged and disrupted the static and stable categories of rape that ‘one side’ 
picks up to attack another (Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity 
in International Criminal Law, 2007).  
In order to prove a crime against humanity, the prosecutor in Gacumbitisi was required not 
only provide of evidence of the rape, but also that the rape of ‘TAS’ occurred as a result of an 
attack against the Tutsi community, even despite the fact it was known to the tribunal she was of 
the Hutu ethnic group (Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in 
International Criminal Law, 2007).  To counter this challenge to the inter-ethnic conflict narrative, 
fixated on collective memory, the tribunal ruled that “through the woman, it was her husband, a 
Tutsi civilian, who was the target” (Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and 
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Ethnicity in International Criminal Law, 2007, p. 14). Thus, in a sense, to prevent her unique 
narrative from disrupting the dominant narrative present in the rape as genocide discourse, her rape 
was not recognized in the manner feminist sociologists have traditionally understood and made 
clear its nature i.e. a crime of power by men to dominate women and thus a crime embodying 
patriarchy. In such a conceptualization of rape the victim would be allowed to remain the subject 
of the abuse, however in Gacumbitisi ‘TAS’s’ was reconstructed “as a crime not against her 
person, but against her husband’s” (Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and 
Ethnicity in International Criminal Law, 2007, p. 14).  
Essentially, the Tribunal held that the rapes of witness TAS and the three other victims did 
occur, but were part of a widespread attack meant to destroy the Tutsi community.  It ruled that 
Gacumbitsi was not “specifically responsible for causing these rapes” (Buss, The Curious 
Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal Law, 2007, p. 14). The 
decision in this case reflects the complexities that arise when wartime sexual violence is only 
examined through the inter-ethnic conflict narrative. Thus, while sexual violence was discussed 
by the Tribunal, systemic inequality of women remains invisible.  This is because the doctrine of 
individual criminal responsibility prevents International Criminal law from recognizing the 
victimization of women due to its preoccupation with fixed categories of specific crimes and 
individual criminal responsibility (Krever, 2013).  Clearly such a reductive understanding of 
violence is predictable within the world of the law, as it is primarily concerned with categories 
(Buss, 2007). 
Besides calling upon Hutu men to rape Tutsi girls, Gacumbitsi went further to specify that 
young Hutu men should be encouraged to rape “girls [who] had refused to marry [them]" (Buss, 
The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal Law, 
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2007, p. 16). While the tribunal in its decision in Gacumbitsi does recount the evidence of several 
raped women and girls whose attackers specifically stated that the rapes were motivated by revenge 
for the women's refusal to marry the men, the tribunal’s decision fails to address and acknowledge 
marriage and rape as a type of revenge against Tutsi women. Such a discussion of what marriage 
meant for both the victims and aggressors serves as a crucial insight into the sexual economy in 
Rwanda which contributed to the conditions for the genocide that took place. But the tribunal’s 
focus on framing the violence through the lens of ethnic conflict allows the existence of this sexual 
economy to go largely unnoticed, and hence rendered invisible (Buss, 2007). 
In the sexual economy that paralleled the ethnic stratification in Rwanda, Tutsi women, at 
least symbolically, were idolized and highly sexualized. Tutsi women constituted social capital for 
Hutu men (Buss, 2007). Therefore, Tutsi women’s sexuality was central in the political 
propaganda used to build up and commence the Rwandan genocide. Constructed images of 
dishonest and cunning Tutsi women were used to belittle the Tutsi group and subsequently to 
convince the Hutu group that the Tutsi were on the verge of conquering and killing them (Buss, 
2007). Furthermore, the Rwandan tribunal’s decisions are full of descriptions about the extreme 
gendered violence and torture that took place primarily against Tutsi women during the genocide. 
However, it is important to discuss that Hutu women were also raped and not merely because of 
their allegiance or sympathy with the Tutsi population or because they had married Tutsi men 
(Buss, 2007). Legal Studies scholar Doris E. Buss states that sexual violence against women in 
Rwanda needs to be understood, to an extent, in the context of men gaining ownership of property 
and assets (Buss, The Curious Visibility of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International 
Criminal Law, 2007). Buss reflects that in Rwanda rapes were constructed as “marriages”; one of 
the key purposes of this was to gain access to assets that women possessed, including land and 
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farming. This violence against women, under the veneer of “marriages” and other coercions to 
gain access to women’s assets, continued to occur after the Rwandan genocide had ended. 
However, there is little or no space at all in the inter-ethnic narrative, where one side picks up ‘rape 
as a weapon’ to attack the other side, to include a recognition of the role of the sexual and gendered 
economy that facilitated and marked the genocide (Buss, 2009). While the Rwanda Tribunals’ 
decisions recognize, to an extent, that the political propaganda leading up to the genocide exposed 
Tutsi women to particular violence, there is a lack of examination of the various ways in which 
gender complicated and intersected with ethnicity to create the circumstances under which 
particular forms of violence were enacted (Buss, 2009).  
Besides a lack of understanding of the sexual economy that was crucial in the build-up to 
the genocide, it is also important to examine how the resistance of victims in wartime violence 
becomes downplayed in the inter-ethnic conflict narrative and the discourse of rape as a weapon 
of war. The identities of victims of violence, and the distinct ways in which they negotiate with 
and resist violence during war, is reflected in the story of Beatrice, a genocide survivor, who 
narrated her experience to journalist Lindsey Hilsum (Pottier, 2002). Beatrice and her daughter 
and son, aged 10 and 6, were Tutsi, living in the Muslim area of Kigali, since they had recently 
converted to Islam. Beatrice’s parents were from Zaire, the current Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) and hence she had a Zairean identity card. Along with a neighbour, a Tutsi woman 
named Laetitia (a pseudonym) and her baby, Beatrice and her children fled Kigali in the early days 
of the genocide. As they made their way to Rwanda’s south-western border, they were repeatedly 
harassed at check points and made to show their identity cards. To protect her, Beatrice altered 
Laetitia’s card to identify her as Hutu, but Laetitia was still raped at check stops. Because Beatrice 
had a Zairean identity card she was often let go and not subjected to violence, but nonetheless had 
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to pay substantial sums of bribery money from the finances she had been allocated by her family. 
However, the neighbour Laetitia and her child were not that fortunate. And while Beatrice 
attempted to protect Laetita from violence through the funds she possessed, Laetitia was repeatedly 
raped. Furthermore, Beatrice’s daughter was extremely vulnerable at check points because she 
apparently had features that made her look like she was of Tutsi descent. As a result, Beatrice 
asked her friend Mamma Naima to take the son and daughter as her own. Thus, Beatrice parted 
company with her children and joined them later again in Cyangugu (Pottier, 2002). 
 Beatrice and her children survived the Rwandan genocide and the interviews she gave were 
done from Bujumbura, Burundi. Beatrice’s story demonstrates the limitation in talking about 
wartime sexual gendered violence through the lens of the grammar of pain in which sexual 
violence (as a legally recognized harm) occurs from the very existence of conflicts taking place 
between two polarized sides. In this sense, we can understand how Beatrice’s narrative of how she 
negotiated the risk of violence and being violated disrupts the construction of the violence script 
utilized in international law to frame ethnic identities as always being fixed and stable. Beatrice’s 
story emphasizes the significance of various other aspects of social position that influence, together 
with ethnic identity, an individual’s vulnerability to violence (Pottier, 2002). 
Beatrice’s narrative clearly demonstrates that individuals targeted for attack are likely to 
have been victimized for multiple reasons, rather than merely their ethnic affiliation. Hence, 
Beatrice’s experience of the genocide was determined by several factors, including who she was 
and what resources she had available. Because she was recognized as being Zairean, she was not 
limited to the Tutsi category and this gave her a degree of protection from violence. Furthermore, 
when she fled and was stopped at checkpoints, she belonged to a Muslim community in a 
predominantly Christian country. She was resourceful in terms of her finances and friends, and she 
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was helped by Hutu friends and strangers. While at the time she managed to resist the violence, as 
evident from her narrative, however she also suffered greatly and died in 1998 (Pottier, 2002). 
However, what I have meant to emphasise in my discussion above is that Beatrice’s narrative is 
an example of a victim of wartime violence who cannot simply be categorized into the stable and 
unchanging category of the “Tutsi” victimized subject of the Rwandan tribunal. Her Zairean 
nationality was more significant in her interaction with some of her potential attackers. 
Furthermore, another aspect of her identity was being Muslim which allowed her to form and 
maintain vital links with friends and neighbours that were crucial to her survival and the steps she 
took to minimize the risk to herself and her children (Pottier, 2002). 
 The purpose of this preceding discussion has been to demonstrate that international law’s 
overt focus on the instrumentalization of rape, or as weapon during wartime that one side utilizes 
to eliminate and conquer the other, renders the narratives of women invisible. While the persistent 
recognition of rape as an instrument of the genocide may rightfully so act as signifier of atrocity, 
it simultaneously works to obscure the individual accounts of sexual violence as well as who is 
considered to fit the victim category. In this part of my essay, I discuss gendered assumptions 
regarding wartime violence in international law.  
Sexual violence in wartime has been typically understood as an issue affecting 
women.  Even those authors who admit that men are also raped often discuss it in a manner that 
minimizes its importance: “Yes, men do get raped, but it is usually by other men and it happens 
less frequently than is the case for women,” claims Sara Sharatt (1999, p. 80), speaking on the 
Foca Indictment at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Similarly, a 
report from the Liu Institute claims -without reference to systematic data- that, while men may be 
more likely to be killed than women, women are far more vulnerable to sexual violence (Liu-
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Institute, 2005) R. Charli Carpenter, in interviews he carried out with humanitarians from 2001 to 
2003, was often told that women comprised the vast majority of rape victims, but these same 
practitioners told him they were unaware of any data collected that assessed the extent of men’s 
vulnerability to sexual assault (Carpenter, 2006). Despite the tendency to treat sexual violence as 
a war crime whose victims are only female subjects, “men and boys have historically been and 
continue to be targeted for sexual violence in particular and gender-specific ways that deserve the 
attention of the human rights community” (Carpenter, 2006). In my discussion here, I aim to draw 
attention to how men are rendered invisible as victims of gendered and sexual violence by 
international criminal law.  
According to Carpenter, the predominant types of sexual violence against men and older 
boys include a combination of rape and sexual mutilation. The ritual castration of male prisoners 
and enslavement of adolescent boys along with women for sexual purposes has historically been 
a prevalent feature of warfare (Carpenter, 2006). The ideological basis of these acts of violence is 
reflected in how these acts are physically and symbolically meant to deprive these males of their 
self-concept as men and to ‘feminize’ them; this is achieved through rape which is seen as the 
ultimate way to eliminate a male’s dignity as a man and through castration as way to deprive him 
of his manhood (Carpenter, 2006). 
During times of armed conflict, together with other forms of torture, crimes against the 
bodily integrity of men are widespread in detention settings. Carpenter discusses several cases of 
sexual assault against men during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, chiefly in detention camps, 
and these acts included castration, circumcision and other forms of sexual mutilation; in many 
cases, prisoners were coerced to engage in sexual acts with the guards or with other prisoners, and 
forced into torturing and mutilating other male prisoners. One scenario involved prisoners being 
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lined up naked while Serb women from outside undressed in front of them; if any prisoner had an 
erection, they would be castrated; another ex-detainee told of suffering electric shocks as 
punishment for experiencing arousal (Carpenter, 2006). Besides being subjected to such 
humiliation and mutilation, men are likely to be “raped anally in detention or forced to sexually 
service male guards” (Carpenter, 2006, p. 95).  
International law has failed to recognize sexual and gendered violence against men as 
constituting sexual violence during wartime and armed conflict. For instance, although sexual 
mutilation of men was reported in the context of the Bosnian concentration camps, it has not been 
prosecuted as rape or sexual violence at the Hague tribunal, instead merely seen as ‘torture’ or 
‘degrading treatment’ with no acknowledgment of the inherent gendered nature of the violence 
meant to explicitly target the bodily integrity and self-concept of the men victimized (Carpenter, 
2006). The invisibility of men as victims of sexual violence largely results from International 
Law’s script of violence.  This script provides the content of the dominant wartime narrative which 
is spoken through a “gendered grammar of violence” (Marcus, 1992, p. 392).  Ultimately, through 
the gendered grammar of violence that emerges in the prosecution of war crimes, gender and 
gendered violence become “synonymous only with women” (Carpenter, 2006).  Hence, through 
the script of violence, men and women are constructed as stable a category which reifies an 
“essentialized notion of women as victims and men as perpetrators” (Carpenter, 2006, p. 99).   
This essentiliazing notion in international law is largely rooted in assumptions about male 
wartime roles. These gendered assumptions impact both how the identities of men and women are 
constructed in the decisions of the tribunals. For example, while clearly there is no doubt what 
happened in Srebrenica in Bosnia is constituted as genocide; in the Krstic decision the Tribunal 
instills a problematic understanding of gender in order to determine its ruling.  In this decision 
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gender emerges as a “static, almost self-evident” category. In the Prosecutor’s analysis, women 
are constructed as merely being the biological reproducers and as signifiers of the patriarchal 
aspects of their community, as opposed to being individuals with agency. The fixed category of 
men as perpetrators in war, and thus outside the realm of the civilian population, which includes 
women and children, emerged as a result of their mass recruitment in the army in the early modern 
period. As a result, since military institutions became male-dominated, the image of the ‘able-
bodied adult male’ arose in the public perception and in the militarized state (Carpenter, 2006). 
Hence, gender hierarchy and relations came to be constructed through the allocation of power to 
weapon-bearing men as the guardians of frail and feeble women, who required their protection 
(Carpenter, 2006).  This gender hierarchy continues to force men into military service through 
actual and threatened physical violence. And thus “masculinized military institutions” in turn 
reinforce gender hierarchies, as women are excluded from the bearing of arms, and as 
disproportionate number of male soldiers generate the image of a “masculinized nation-at-arms” 
voluntarily ready (rather than coerced) to fight (Carpenter, 2006). Consequently, this hierarchical 
order of gender relations infiltrates into international law, which then locates them in the category 
of the perpetrator of violence.  Hence, due to international law’s preoccupation with categories, 
the identities of men and women are essentialized; the former are constituted as inherently being 
aggressive and prone to violence and the latter are constituted as being defenseless, perpetual 
victims and ‘inherently rapeable’ (Marcus, 1992, p. 388). 
One of the most convincing examples of International law’s essentializing process of fixed 
gender identities in wartime, is the gendered way the concept of the ‘civilian’ has been constructed 
in international law. Because international’s law recognizes men solely as aggressors, in conflict 
situations it consequently makes them appear, in a sense, existing outside the civilian population. 
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This in turn leads to the perception that men of an ethnic and/or age demographic are always 
potential threats. Consequently, then, this perception encourages sex-selective patterns of atrocity 
against even those men who manage to remain in the civilian sector, and resist fighting. This 
transpires when codified laws requiring belligerents to distinguish between combatants and 
civilian on the basis of a person’s actual participation in war are, in fact, interpreted according to 
the use of sex as a means to recognize the enemy (Carpenter, 2006). Evidently, then, gendered 
assumptions about wartime roles explain this tendency in conflict zones, and continue to be 
reinforced by international law in post-conflict trials where men are only recognized as 
perpetrators, thus rendering violence against men, which includes sexual violence and sex-
selective massacre, invisible.  
International Law’s construction of violence as primarily “the product of an inter-ethnic 
conflict” fails to consider how it is influenced by other social, political and economic structures. 
For instance, in the Rwanda Tribunal’s decision “all sexual violence is reduced to the equation of 
‘Hutu men who raped Tutsi women as a means to destroy the Tutsi community’” (Buss, 2009, p. 
160). Hence the Tribunal’s decision frames the violence against women occurring primarily as a 
way to eliminate an ethnic group; the Tutsi community. However, as observed by anthropologist 
Jennie Burnet, it is more so men, and thus not women, who are seen to embody ethnicity (Burnet, 
2009). Hence, destroying an ethnic group often is seen achievable through the elimination of its 
male members, while women can be appropriated into the ethnic identity of the attacking group. 
While I recognize that this observation only is relevant to cases where target groups were defined 
according to ethnicity, it does hold relevance in such contexts as the Rwandan Genocide. In 
Rwanda, Hutu attackers took some Tutsi women as their wives, after their husbands and children 
had been killed (Carpenter, 2006). Furthermore, according to a 1995 African Rights Report, Hutu 
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sympathisers convinced the Hutu attackers to spare women because they did not denote ethnicity; 
‘the bad ones were men’ and female survivors reported being told they were safe because ‘sex has 
no ethnic group’ (African-Rights, 1995a). While I do not dispute that women were severely 
victimized which reflected a shared pattern of sexual violence, the possibility that men would have 
also been targeted to eliminate a community disrupts International law’s reduction of the Rwandan 
Genocide as primarily Hutu men who harmed Tutsi women.  
Wartime sexual violence “is treated as relatively uniform in practice and experience” 
(Buss, 2009, p. 155) due to fixed and stable constructions of gender identity i.e. aggressor (men) 
and victim (women). This focus on shared patterns of violence, against women or women of a 
distinct ethnic group by men, provides the content of the communal narrative and subsequently 
renders the inconsistencies and exceptions to this very narrative, which are present in the memory 
of victims, largely invisible (Buss, 2009). Furthermore, this pre-occupation with fixed gender 
identities also determines who gets to be recognized as a victim of wartime violence. Particularly 
female victims must find space within the role of the ‘inherent rapeable’ subject who is vulnerable 
to violence during wartime and male victims are unlikely to have their narrative of sexual violence 
recognized as gendered violence, in International law.  
This clearly has been the case with Beatrice’s own narrative of violence as a female victim, 
mentioned previously in this essay; the resources and connections she had influenced her survival, 
also it is possible that she was able to resist violence, possibly because the Hutu attackers might 
have seen as her not representing ethnicity (Pottier, 2002). The fact that some Tutsi women were 
taken as ‘wives’, while still an indication they were sexually violated and treated as claimed 
property by Hutu men, provides us with insights about the pre-existing sexual economy in Rwanda 
where Tutsi women as mistresses were recognized as social capital (Buss, The Curious Visibility 
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of Wartime Rape: Gender and Ethnicity in International Criminal Law, 2007). Gaining access to 
women’s bodies through “marriage” also allowed men access to the assets they owned including 
land and farming. Yet, in the inter-ethnic narrative in which victims are located, and where sexual 
violence is spoken of through an almost dictated rape script; where one side picks up ‘rape as a 
weapon’ to attack the other side (Buss, 2009), there is no room to include the context of the sexual-
gendered economy that was crucial to the momentum the genocide took in Rwanda. Paradoxically, 
the hyper-visibility of wartime sexual violence through the inter-ethnic conflict narrative renders 
invisible - or at least invisible a significant factor of - women’s systemic inequality.  
The rigid focus on the generalised pattern of rape can lead to an essentializing narrative in 
which wartime sexual violence is treated as seemingly inevitable. An alternative approach to 
treating gendered violence as relatively similar with fixed gender identities, as dictated by the rape 
script in International law, can be found by examining the unique narratives of victims. Beatrice’s 
story allows us to explore the various circumstances that exposed her to violence and the brave 
steps she took to resist rape and death (Buss, 2009). It is at this level of detail, with all the 
inconsistencies and complexities revealed, that it becomes possible to imagine a situation where 
women are not seen as ‘inherently rapeable’ (Marcus, 1992, p. 388) beings but as individuals who 
have resilience and thus negotiate, interact, and resist the systemic inequality they live with and 
the sexual economy they are part of (Buss, 2007). Furthermore, in post-conflict trials when women 
are seen as “always raped”, all men are only recognized as perpetrators, and instances involving 
men as victims of rape, sexual mutilation, and mass killings are not recognized under gendered 
violence, despite the sex-selective nature of these acts (Carpenter, 2006).  
International law embodies reductionist logic in terms of what can be spoken and 
understood about the impact on the victims of gendered sexual violence, and its role in the 
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genocide.  Rape as a ‘weapon of war’ renders both male and female victims of violence in war 
invisible, as it depicts violence “exclusively as the product of an inter-ethnic conflict rather than 
considering how other social political and economic structures shaped the violence and genocide” 
(Buss, 2009, p. 160). Pinpointing rape at the centre of the conflict—as an integral element of the 
violence—is an important effort which allows us to recognize that violence is indeed gendered in 
nature. However, without minimizing the impact of communal suffering as a result of sexual 
violence, it is essential to observe how this inter-ethnic narrative of sexual violence conveys a 
partial account of the violence. Hence, in international law the communal narrative’s triumph over 
the individual narrative and memory of the victim becomes possible through ‘the grammar of 
pain’. This grammar of pain is inherently gendered and consequently provides rules and structures 
to assign people to positions within a script of violence. Furthermore, when wartime sexual 
violence “is treated as relatively uniform in practice and experience” (Buss, 2009, p. 155), the 
focus on shared patterns of violence provides the content of the collective memory of suffering, 
which renders exceptions and variances found in the narratives of individual men and women 
invisible (Buss, 2009).  
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